Her yer inşaat, her yer şantiye!(BirGün’de söyleşi)

ktp27 Ocak 2105 BirGün’de yayımlanan söyleşi;

İnşaat üzerinde büyük paralar dönüyor ve bunu rüşvet şeklinde paylaşma imkânı var. Bunu yaparken hukukun çiğnenmesine göz yumarsınız  ve ortaya çıkan ranttan da hakkınızı istersiniz. Bu sayede de siyaseten  bir mali kaynak ve güç elde edersiniz. Bu nedenle inşaatın AKP tarafından tercih edilmesinin özel bir önemi var

NESLİHAN KARATAŞ neslihankaratas@birgun.net

Bu kadar çok inşaat, kimisini hayrete, dehşete düşürür, kimisinde de hayranlık uyandırır. 2003 sonrasında seçmenleri dev şantiyelerin etkilediğinden emin olabilirsiniz. Gökdelenler, villalar, korunaklı siteler, duble yollar, havaalanları, terminaller, tüneller, Marmaray, metrobüs, içinde adalet olmayan adalet sarayları, Ak Saray… Bütün bunları büyüme, gelişme, iş bilme, iş bitirme, itibar sembolü olarak gören hatırı sayılır bir seçmen kitlesi olduğundan emin olabilirsiniz. Yoksa AKP oyları yüzde 30’lardan yüzde 50’lerin eşiğine nasıl gelirdi?” Mustafa Sönmez, AK Faşizmin İnşaat İskelesi isimli son kitabında bu soruya yanıt arıyor.

>> Yeni kitabınız ‘Ak Faşizmin İnşaatı’ hakkında biraz bilgi verebilir misiniz?
AKP’nin kendi siyasi rejimini ki ben buna ‘Ak faşizm’ dedim, bunu inşa etmek için 12 yıldır ekonomiyi nasıl kullandığına değindim kitapta. Biliyorsunuz, bir inşaat iskele etrafında yükselir AKP’nin yükselişi de inşaat sektörü üstünden gerçekleşti ağırlıkla. Niye 12 yıldır sermaye birikiminin odağında inşaat var, AKP’nin buradan devşirdiği siyasi rantlar nedir, buna parmak basan bir ağırlığı var kitabın. Ana hatlarıyla, AKP’nin siyasi yükselişinde ekonomiyi ve özellikle inşaat sektörünü nasıl basamak olarak kullandığı, parlak günleri ve şimdi inişe geçişinden dolayı kararmaya başlayan günlerini anlattım kitapta.

>> İktidar özellikle seçmenlerini yaptığı yollar, havaalanları metrobüs, terminal gibi yapılarla etkilemeye çalışıyor. Bu seçmen için yeterli bir neden midir?
Seçmen açısından bunun şöyle cazip yanları var: İnsanlar her zaman ekonomik büyümeden etkilenirler. Tarihimize baktığımızda ekonomik büyümenin olduğu yıllarda kim iktidarsa oya tahvil etmiştir kendisini. Çünkü büyüme demek sonuçta iş-aş demek. Seçmene iyi kötü bir istihdam imkanı, reel  ücretlerde büyüme oranında değilse bile enflasyona yakın bir artış, devletin büyümeden dolayı vergi gelirinin artması, propagandasını çok iyi yaptığı sosyal kurumlar ve yardımlar yolsuzluk, hırsızlık olaylarına rağmen oy oranını çok fazla geriletmedi. Büyüme, büyümeyi de inşaat üzerinden sürdürme, seçmende bir iş imkânı, yan sanayileri harekete geçirmesi, tüketici kredisi ile konut satın alma erişimi gibi noktalarda inşaatın diğer alanlarındaki yatırımları ile birlikte hepsi özellikle ilkeli siyasi tercihi olmayan seçmen kitlesini etkileyen ve AKP’ye oy vermeye sevk eden süreçler oldu.

>>Enflasyon, büyüme, işsizlik oranlarına baktığımızda aslında kara bir tablo ile karşı karşıyayız. AKP’nin bu alanları iyileştirme açısından bir manevra alanı yok mudur?  Neden sadece yapı inşa etmek üzerine bir politika izliyor?
2003’ten başlayarak büyüme sürecinin hem iç hem dış gerekçeleri var. İçerde 2001 krizini aşan programın uygulayıcılarından devralınan reforme edilmiş ekonomi mirası rol oynadı. AKP böyle şanslı bir mirası devraldı. Bunun yanı sıra dış dünyada da ekonomi konjonktürü bir likitide fazlası olan dış paranın adres aradığı bir döneme denk geldi. Türkiye’ye eskiden hiç gelmediği kadar para geldi. Bu iki etken birdenbire bir büyüme imkânı ortaya çıkardı. AKP mümkün olduğu kadar burada inşaat sektörünü (Özellikle Toki ve Emlak konutu kullanarak) öne çekti ve bir inşaat odaklı büyümeye yönlendirdi kendisini. AKP’nin bunu inşaat üzerinden yapmasının iki nedeni vardı. Birincisi inşaat mütehitleri gibi kendisinin organik sermayedarlarını inşaat üzerinden yaratmasıydı. Diğer bir neden ise; inşaat hep izinlere bağlı bir sektördür.  Her an resmi otoriterin yönlendirebileceği, müdahale edebileceği kısıtlayabileceği bir alandır inşaat. Dolayısıyla ipleri hep elinde tutmak istedi.  Bunun yanı sıra inşaat üzerinde büyük paralar ve bunu rüşvet şeklinde paylaşma imkânı var.  İnşaat tüm bunlara çok uygun bir sektör. Yani izni verirsiniz, yer yer imar hukukunu çiğnemesine göz yumarsınız ama ortaya çıkan ranttan da hakkınızı istersiniz bu sayede de siyaseten  bir mali kaynak ve güç elde edersiniz. Buna imkân tanıyan bir sektör olduğu için de inşaatın AKP tarafından tercih edilmesinin özel bir önemi var. Bu AKP’ ye ciddi anlamda bir basamak çıkma imkânı verdi.

>>AKP’nin üretimde sanayiye dayalı ekonomi politikası yok. Bu durum AKP hükümeti içerisinde de (Ali Babacan, Mehmet Şimşek) ayrılıklara neden oluyor. Bu fikir ayrılıkları daha da büyür mü? Erdoğan neden bu kadar ısrarcı?
Ali Babacan ve Mehmet Şimşek, dış dünyayla yakın temas içerisindeler ve dış sermaye kaçırılırsa ya da gelmezse Türkiye fena krize girer bunun farkındalar. Dolayısıyla sermayeyi hoşnut tutacak, dış sermayeyi ürkütmeyecek IMF, Dünya Bankası gibi kuruluşların tavsiyelerini ve analizlerini hükümetin dikkatte alması gerektiğini savunuyorlar. Erdoğan, tabii esas olarak kendi rejimini tam manasıyla inşa etmenin derdinde. Ve şunun farkında eğer ekonomi küçülmeye başlarsa kendi arkasındaki sermayeciler ve iç pazara dönük üretim yapan işletmelerin tadı kaçacak. Şu an haziran seçimlerine kilitlenmiş durumda ve seçimlerde oy kaybetmek istemiyor.  En son bu meclisteki hırsızlık oylamasındaki 48 fire kendisini çok tedirgin etti, uykuları kaçtı çünkü hiçbir şekilde bir geri düşüşe tahammülü yok.  Dolayısıyla ekonomiye doğrudan buradan bakıyor.  Uzun vadeli programlardan ziyade kısa vadede beni hedefe hangi politika yaklaştırır iç güdüsüyle davranıyor.

>>Yolsuzluklar ve Ak Saray hala gündemde. Bu durum neden seçmeni etkilemedi?
12 yıllık AKP rejimi siyaseti, seçmen kitlesinde de ilginç bir dönüşüm yarattı. Aslında politik islamın oy potansiyeli yüzde 15-20 civarındadır. AKP, ilk iktidar olduğunda oy oranı yüzde 34 civarındaydı.  Şimdi bu rakama çıkması 2001 krizi ile ilgiliydi. Bu kriz, toplum üzerinde çok fazla hasar yaratmıştı. Bu nedenle kitleler biraz da öfkeyle AKP’ye yöneldiler. İnsanlar iş-aş meselesi, güvencesiz de olsa evlerine para giriyor olması durumu bir ölçüde bu kitleleri etkiledi. Yanı sıra insanlar 2003’ten başlayarak ciddi bir tüketici kredisi kullanmaya başladılar ve hane halkı borç yükü de arttı ve kitlelerin bu uygulanmakta olan rejimin ekonomi politikaları ile bir tür bağımlılık ilişkisi ve rehin alma durumu ortaya çıktı. AKP bu durumu çok iyi kullandı. Bu nedenle yolsuzluk meselesinde bile ortaya bu kadar kanıt dökülmesine rağmen seçmen kitlesinin gözünde de aklandılar. Genel olarak burada seçmen kimyasının değiştiğini, seçmenin değer erezyonu yaşadığının da farkında olmak gerekir.

>>AKP’nin ekonomi kurmayları özellikle yüksek ihracat rakamları ile övünüyor. Siz nasıl görüyorsunuz bu durumu?
Aslında AKP’nin o söylemlerdeki gibi yüksek bir ihracatı yok,  ithalatı daha fazla. Ortalama yılda 70 milyar dolar dış ticaret açığı var. Bunun olabilmesi için sanayiye ağırlık vermesi ve sanayi ürünleri ihracat edebilmesi gerekiyor. Yani bu iddiası sadece söylemlerde kalan bir durum oluyor.

>> 2003 yılında AKP’nin sahneye çıkmasıyla birlikte Türkiye’nin bugünkü durumunu tarifleyebilir misiniz kısaca?
Başta anlattığım gibi dış para girişinin esas olduğu  ve iç pazara dönük bir ekonomi politikası mevcut iktidarın. Madalyonun bir yüzünde; iyi bir bütçe  performansı bunla beraber popülist bir sosyal siyaset uygulaması gerçeği var. Madalyonun arka yüzünde ise, çok ciddi bir kırılganlık, döviz yaratamayan bir ekonomi, 400 milyar dolarlık bir dış borç stoku ve sürdürülemez bir rejimin tıkanması durumu var. Önümüzde artık büyüyen bir Türkiye değil, küçülen, patinaj yapan, yer yer gerileyen, buradan başlayarak kitlelerin yavaş yavaş şikâyetçi olacakları bir yakın gelecek var.

>> Dünya ekonomisine baktığımızda merkez bankalarının uyguladığı para politikaları ne türden yeni kırılganlıklar yaratıyor ve bu politikaların  Türkiye’ye etkisi nasıl olacak?
2008-2009 krizinin üzerinden 7-8 yıl geçmesine rağmen tam aşılamadı. Amerika bunu piyasalara çok yüksek paralar enjekte ederek aşmaya çalıştı. Şimdi ise onun yaptığını Avrupa Merkez Bankası yapmaya çalışıyor.Ülkelerde bu tarz politikaların sonuç vermesi için kamunun dahil olabileceği ekonomi politikalarının izlenmesi şart. Aksi uygulandığında kitlelerin alım gücü düşüyor ve yoksullaşma başlıyor. Buradan şöyle bir kolaycılığa kaçmamak gerekiyor, ekonomi performansı düşse bile bunun hemen oylara ve siyasete yansımasını beklememek gerekir. Yani ekonomik krizden böyle bir medet ummamak gerekiyor.

>> Uygulanan bu ekonomi politikalarına karşı sol siyasetlerin toplum üzerinde ikna edici  ekonomi politikaları, neler olabilir?
Ekonomi  politikalarından ziyade bence topluma adalet, hukuk, insan hakları, demokrasi gibi normlardan yaklaşmak daha anlamlı. Özellikle her gün bir hukuk katliamı yaşanıyor. Ali İsmail Korkmaz’ın duruşmasından çıkan sonuç mesela.. Herkesin gözüne sokularak yapılan yolsuzluk ve rüşvet olayının meclisteki oylaması, Kaçak Saray üzerinden ihlal edilen normlar, değerler ortada. Bunların bence  kitlelere iyi anlatılması gerekiyor. Elbette solun kendi ait bir ekonomi politikası olması gerekiyor ama Türkiye’nin bu konjonktüründe solun esas olarak gerçekten bir Ak faşizme dönen rejimi  teşhir etmesi ve kitlelerin bununla neler kaybettiğini görmesinin anlatılması lazım. Bagajı cesetlerle dolu bu iktidarın bu cesetlerinin teşhir edilmesi gerekiyor.

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Alarming unemployment figures among university graduates in Turkey

MUSTAFA SÖNMEZ – Hürriyet Daily News, January 26 2015

The most alarming aspect of the unemployment reality is that nearly one-fourth of the officially unemployed as of October 2014 consisted of university graduates. DAILY NEWS photo
Economic growth, which is estimated to have dropped to 2.5 percent in 2014, has also made unemployment climb. The Turkish Statistical Institute (TÜİK) recently revealed unemployment data for October of last year; official unemployment, seasonally adjusted, came in at 10.6 percent, while non-agricultural unemployment rate was 12.7 percent.

jjAccording to TÜİK, the official number of unemployed people is now 3,095,000. This figure was around 2.5 million for the same month last year. Thus, while 580,000 people have been added to the ranks of the officially unemployed in the last 12 months since October 2013, unemployment has increased 1.4 points.

Numbers climbing

According to TÜİK data, non-agricultural unemployment is climbing even faster. While the non-agricultural unemployment rate was 10.5 percent in October 2012, in 2013 it climbed to 11.1 percent and then to 12.7 percent in October 2014. Thus, in two years, non-agricultural unemployment climbed 2.2 points. The number of official unemployed has exceeded 3,095,000. The unofficial, uncounted number of unemployed reached 2,457,000. Out of these, 2.4 million have not looked for a job during the past week but they represent a population that says they are ready to work if there is a job opportunity. When these non-counted unemployed are also taken into consideration, then the number of unemployed exceeds 5.5 million, while the real unemployment rate goes up from 10.6 to 17.6 percent, climbing 7 points.

With economic growth dropping in the last quarter compared to the previous quarter, unemployment has climbed; it is estimated that the climb witnessed in September and October will also continue for the subsequent two months.

ööAlarm

The most alarming aspect of the unemployment reality was that nearly one-fourth of the officially unemployed as of October 2014 consisted of university graduates.

The number of unemployed university graduates was 725,000 in October 2014, whereas this figure was 488,000 at the beginning of February 2014. This means that in less than a year, the number of college graduates looking for a job has increased by 237,000 people; also, the figure increased 48 percent between February and October.

According to TÜİK data, when the education level of the unemployed is reviewed, 51 percent of the officially unemployed do not have a high school diploma. In second place are university graduates at 24 percent. Regular high school graduates total 11 percent, as do vocational high school graduates. The illiterate unemployed are last at 3 percent.

In the period between February and October 2014, the number of unemployed increased 218,000, almost 8 percent, but in the university graduate segment, this increase reached a striking 48 percent.

The share of this segment in total unemployment was 17 percent at the beginning of February; this went up to 24 percent in October. This is considered an indication that a significant number of 2014 graduates have not been able to find a job and that new graduates will have difficulty in finding a job in the coming years as well and that the number of unemployed university graduates will further increase.

When official unemployment was at an average of 10.2 percent in February 2014, this was 9 percent for university graduates. However, in October, average unemployment was 10.4 percent while unemployment among the higher educated went up to 12 percent.

There is another, more striking reality: It is women who make up a significant portion of unemployed university graduates. Among 775,000 unemployed university graduates, 420,000 of them, in other words 54 percent, are women.

Education, which is an important avenue of upward mobility for women, seems insufficient; there is also the matter of finding a job after graduation where women are again shoved behind and lead the group of “educated and unemployed.”

Quantity over quality

The fact that a portion of the young population looks as if they are receiving higher education actually camouflages real unemployment. As graduates increase, unemployment will increase ever more.

The boom in the number of unemployed university graduates is a result of the inflated number of higher education students during the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) regime. The number of universities was increased without taking quality into consideration. Since 2006, 51 state universities and 48 foundation (private) universities have been formed. Thus, universities looked as if they were in all provinces. At the end of 2014, the total number of universities reached 176, with 104 being state and 72 of them being foundation universities.

Separately, the quota of the full-time regular higher education was inflated. Between 2006 and 2014, this quota was increased 83 percent and reached 793,000 students. The number of students exceeded 5.5 million.

In 2014, the number of people applying to sit the nationwide university entrance and placement exam exceeded 2 million for the first time to become 2,008,000.

Despite this increase in quantity, questions about “quality” are mentioned in the Development Ministry’s 2015 Program. It says the high number of applicants for the central examination and the rising proportion of graduates (looking for a second university education) and students (trying to change schools) show the need to increase the quality of higher education.

“In this context, vocational guidance services at the high school level should be improved, the policy of increasing the quotas should be reviewed, and the relationship between the higher education and the workforce market should be strengthened,” it said.

Arguing that the “schooling rate” of the population at the age of higher education or that access to higher education has increased from 9 to 38 percent in just a couple of years is just sweeping the dirt under the carpet. However, the real problem starts with graduation, as each graduate finds himself/herself among the “army of the unemployed.”

As seen in 2014, in one academic year, the number of university graduates can increase 48 percent.

This situation indicates that the young population who had access to a higher education somewhat devoid of quality will soon inflate the “crowd of the unemployed.”

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The political gain of the construction boom

MUSTAFA SÖNMEZ – Hürriyet Daily News, January /19/2015

It could be said that, in the climb of the ruling Justice and Development Party’s (AKP) regime beginning in 2003, in the rise of its voting base from 30 percent to 50 percent, that it was the rapid growth of Turkey’s capitalism experienced in the 2000s which has been the most effective contributor; moreover, it has played the most significant role.

The political Islam that did not reach a 20 percent share of the total votes in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s was in power after the Nov. 3, 2002, elections with 34 percent of the votes. It increased its votes in subsequent elections and became the first party; in its building of an Islamic regime, economic growth and its economic platform have played the most important role.

This growth was made possible by foreign capital inflow that reached $40 billion annually. This foreign resource was mostly used in the domestic market. In this domestic market-oriented growth, it was construction, especially mass housing, that led the sector.

As of 2014, the AKP regime clung on to this line, insisting on it because they prioritized their political targets more than anything else. It was a preference at the cost of leaving a huge foreign debt of $400 billion (half of the national income) and a series of fragilities and structural malfunctions.
The political gain of focusing on construction is maybe more than its economic gain.

Political benefit

Before the AKP government, Turkey went through a crisis in 2001 and in order to overcome this crisis a bitter program controlled by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and using IMF loans managed by former Deputy Prime Minister Kemal Derviş was implemented. This bitter program was what the AKP inherited with its “reformed” economic infrastructure after 2002. With the appeal of a revised, updated economy, beginning in 2003, foreign capital rapidly flew into the country, creating the platform for the construction-oriented growth.

In the junction reached in 2002, instead of construction, export-based industry could have been chosen and growth would have proceeded “industry-oriented,” but this was not done. While the AKP chose construction as the locomotive, its political expectations were, at the least, as high as its economic expectations. Construction was quite a suitable track, both for attracting voters and for creating the AKP’s own organic capital-owner.

sssThe rapidly rising housing complexes, skyscrapers, malls, accelerated municipality investments, double-wide roads, highway investments, airports, tunnels, metros and viaducts; these were all accomplishments that the voter would perceive as growth-development.

Moreover, each construction investment meant job opportunity for a significant segment of the population, including producers of construction materials, operators of construction equipment, small and medium-sized construction subcontractors and both qualified and non-qualified workers. The number of people working in the construction sector was around 1 million in 2004; by 2014, this figure had reached nearly 2.2 million. This corresponds to an increase of 115 percent during that period. While the share of the sector in total employment was 5.1 percent in 2004, by 2014 it had risen to 8.3 percent.

These construction-real estate employment statistics are for those workers who are directly involved in construction. Those employed in the production of construction materials, workers in stone quarries and marble quarries or the while collar personnel in the service sector, should also be added to the 2.2 million number. When they are added, then we can say that the share of this sector in total employment will go beyond 10 percent.

It is apparent that this created employment, especially in a country where official unemployment is 11 percent and real unemployment is 18 percent, has a significant place in the political choice of the voter.

Construction permits

The sector’s dependence on “licenses” from the local and central administrations plays an important role in the AKP’s passion for construction. A series of decisions, from construction permits to occupancy permits, to development plans of a plot, to the number of flats or changes in a project, are all in the jurisdiction of municipalities, the Environment and City Planning Ministry and also the Mass Housing Authority (TOKİ). It was observed in the transcripts of the phone recordings that were revealed during the Dec. 17 and 25, 2013, graft operations how Ankara was interfering in these decisions and what kind of unjust profits were obtained.

The construction industry’s dependence on licensing from the political authority also creates the opportunity for favors and look-outs for contractors, the selection of project partners and the way the authority issues licenses. The AKP has found the opportunity to create its own bourgeoisie by using these powers within the constriction-oriented growth.

The General Directorate of Building Land Office, the agency that manages public land, has been associated with TOKİ since 2003, granting vast stocks of land. Emlak Konut, which is the land marketing associate of Emlak Bank, was also made an associate of TOKİ. After this, the most prestigious plots and luxury housing units were built by construction groups such as Ağaoğlu, Aşçıoğlu,Varyap, İhlas, Torunlar, Kuzu and Egeyapı.

While the pro-government contracting firms grew rich through this model, their dependency on the AKP also grew. Contracting groups for public construction bids were added to them. Company groups such as Limak, Cengiz, Kolin, Kalyon and Çeçen peaked by winning infrastructure bids from the state and remaining loyal to the AKP, as pro-government capital owners.

It is of course the decision of the political authority in the construction sector for this much dependence on “state licenses,” to which the profits of a metropolis such as Istanbul would be granted. However, it is also understandable that the entire profit would not be granted completely to the capital owner. A portion of this profit could have been given directly to the AKP or to foundations under its control as donations. It can be said that these donations have become the most important leverage in the AKP’s political climb.

Is it the end of the paradigm?

As of mid-2013, the inflow of foreign capital to Turkey halved. Balance of payment data from November 2014 shows that the total of foreign resources inflow in the first 11 months had been below $42 billion, whereas, in the same period in 2013, this total had reached $68 billion. This corresponds to a drop of nearly 40 percent.

The halving of the foreign resource inflow, causing low growth in the economy, is also associated with the usage of inflowing capital, not in a foreign currency generating context, but in a foreign currency-consuming context during the AKP regime.

The foreign capital inflow, instead of being direct investments, was structured as “foreign loans” to the rate of three fourths. This was used mostly in construction, in other service sectors oriented toward the domestic market, in consumption, in industry intermediate goods and for the import of investment goods.

The construction sector stood out as a foreign currency-consuming sector more than a foreign currency-generating sector, one that pulled down and blinded the economy’s capacity to gain foreign currency.
According to Central Bank records, Turkey’s foreign currency gain from real estate sales has not exceeded an average of $3 billion annually. The fact that an economy where the tourism sector provides around $30 billion annually was only able to gain $3billion annually from construction explains the dependency of the sector anyway.

And stagnation

It was obvious that an economy which was oriented toward the domestic market, which was dependent on domestic demand, two aspects which have been consolidated with the performance of the construction sector, was unsustainable with decreasing foreign capital inflow. The orientation toward the domestic market meant a continuous appetite for foreign currency, a continuous current account deficit and, in order to finance it, foreign loans. The stopping of the money inflow meant the stopping of the economy and stagnation became apparent in 2014.

Here also, the construction sector, more precisely the house-building sector, was the one that began having troubles the earliest. As a matter of fact, the hike in foreign currency rates that was prompted by the drop in foreign resource inflow and the increasing of interest rates to curb this caused house sales to drop. Despite all the campaigns and facilitations of long-term sales, according to Turkish Statistical Institute (TÜİK) data, new home sales in the first 11 months of 2014 increased only 1 percent compared to the same period in 2013. In Istanbul, where 20 percent of the sales take place, new home sales fell 3 percent, whereas in Ankara, which has a 10 percent share in sales, home sales fell 1.5 percent. Mortgage sales in particular fell. While the share of mortgaged new home sales was 40 percent of the total home sales in 2013, this fell to 30 percent in 2014. This should be an important warning for the sector.

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The dollar will again shake the world in 2015

 

MUSTAFA SÖNMEZ – Hürriyet Daily News/Jan.12. 2015

 The U.S. dollar, which rapidly strengthened in 2014, shook the world’s several local currencies, strong or weak, last year. Many local currencies lost value against the dollar. The euro, especially in the second half of 2014, was seriously shaken, but nevertheless, its annual average value in 2014 was the same as its average annual value in 2013. Thus, its position against the dollar stayed the same on an annual average basis. But it is difficult to say the same for 2015.

The Japanese yen, the British pound, Norwegian, Swedish and Danish  krone and the Canadian dollar were all currencies that continuously lost value against the U.S. dollar. The rates are, of course, different; the currencies of emerging countries, including Turkey, lost values in different rates.

On the other hand, there are also currencies that did not lose value, but gained value, against the U.S. dollar: For example, the Chinese Yuan, as well as the South Korean won and the Australian dollar.

Biggest losers

Most of the 52 world currencies that the IMF monitors were shaken before the U.S. dollar value rose. The fastest devaluating currencies were the Iranian riyal and the Russian  ruble, with the Turkish Lira taking third place.

HDN The local currency of Iran, a country which has been at odds with the U.S. for many years, the riyal, rapidly lost value against the dollar in 2013 and 2014. The annual average of the riyal in 2014 was 38 percent below its annual value in 2013. Iran went through shock devaluation such as 102 percent on July 3, 2013. After the devaluation, the riyal continued its course with small fluctuations.

After the shock fall in oil prices, Iran’s export income decreased and now it is anticipated with curiosity whether or not the country will opt for a new shock devaluation.

The most severe tremor against the dollar was experienced by the Russian ruble. Russia, which has the fifth biggest reserve in the world with $454 billion, had to go through tough times in 2014 against the sanctions Westerns countries imposed upon it because of the Ukraine and Crimea issues. When the flight of capital outside the country was added to the blow of the fall in oil prices, the ruble rapidly lost value. Even though the Russian Central Bank tried to stop the blood loss by increasing interest rates, this did not help much.

The first half of 2014 was calm and one dollar was only about 38 rubles toward the end of September. However, with October, blows came one after the other and at the last day of the year 1 dollar was up to 57 rubles. The annual average of the dollar in 2014 was 38.6 rubles. The average in 2013 was 32 rubles. Thus, based on annual averages, the ruble lost value 21 percent against the dollar.

The loss of the lira 

It was Turkey that emerged after Russia  among the local currencies that devaluated the most in 2014. As of mid-year in 2013, the value loss of the lira increased. Especially with the influence of the political risk that climbed with Dec. 17 and 25 corruption operations of 2013, the devaluation of the lira accelerated.

The climb in the dollar was curbed for a while with the intervention of the Central Bank with high interest rates in January 2014; it accelerated again as of September 2014. Turkey, which always had a dose of political risk as well as economic fragility, had increased geopolitical risks because of the hot war in the Middle East, resulting in receiving one half of foreign capital inflow. While this was a factor constantly pushing dollar prices upward, especially with the news that the U.S. may draw forth the increase in interest rates, prompted foreigners to change position and leave Turkey, keeping the dollar high. The yearly average was 2.20 liras. The dollar which completed 2013 at an average of 1.91 liras, thus, was up 15 percent.

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Other emerging currencies

While  Russia and Turkey, among emerging countries, took the top positions on the list in 2014 by losing 21 percent and 15 percent respectively, there were falls in other emerging countries’ currencies. The local currencies of those emerging countries that grew their economies with external source inflow were negatively affected with capital outflow depending on their fragility levels.

The Indonesian rupiah lost nearly 14 percent from 2013 to 2014. The South African rand devaluated nearly 12.5 percent. The Brazilian real lost 9 percent against the U.S. dollar. The value losses of the Mexican peso and the Indian rupee stayed at lower levels such as 4 percent.

A European emerging country, the Czeck Republic’s koruna devaluated by 6 percent, while the Hungarian forint went down 4 percent. The Polish zloty, on the other hand, had a slight gain of 2 in 1,000 against the U.S. dollar.

The euro and other European currencies 

The euro’s annual average of 2013 was $1.33. The 2014 yearly average was the same. Thus there was no change in terms of yearly averages. However, this should not make us underestimate the euro’s rapid loss of value in the second half of 2014.

The euro started 2014 with $1.36 and remained at that level until mid-July. However, it experienced a constant value loss the rest of the year and completed the last day of 2014 with $1.21. While in the first half of the year, the dollar/euro parity was 1.37, in the second half it went down to 1.27. In other words, there was a 7 percent loss of value in the second half, compared to the average of the first half. Expectations are that the loss of value in the euro will continue in 2015.

First of all, the U.S. dollar started 2015 with a strong move and the euro/dollar parity came to its lowest level in the past four and a half years. The rapid devaluation of the euro against the dollar is important in terms of global competitiveness and in terms of the relationship of Turkish exportation and its tourism industry with the euro. The parity first becoming 1.20, then 1.18 and then falling as low as $1.14 would mean an average of 7 percent loss in profits for the Turkish exporters and tourism managers.

Besides the euro, among European currencies, the British pound completed the year with more than 5 percent devaluation against the dollar. The Norwegian krone lost an average of 7 percent yearly against the dollar.




It was not only the currencies of developed countries that lost value against the U.S. dollar in 2014; currencies of central countries also experienced significant losses. Among those non-European rich countries, the Japanese yen lost more than 8 percent value against the dollar in 2014 compared to 2013. The Canadian dollar also closed 2014 with a loss of 7.3 percent against the American dollar.

Among the currencies which did not lose value against the U.S. dollar were oil producing Middle Eastern countries. Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Qatar, Libya, the UAE and Kuwait currencies kept their values against the dollar.

Even though 2014 was the year of the U.S. dollar, certain currencies gained value against the dollar.

The main currencies the values of which exceeded their 2013 averages in 2014 averages have been the Chinese yuan with 0.8 percent, the Swiss franc with 1.2 percent, the Korean won with 3.9 percent and Australian dollar with 6.7 percent.

What will happen in 2015?

The shocking climb of the dollar in 2014 is expected to continue in 2015. With the interest rate increases the U.S. has announced, it is possible that the direction of capital movements will turn absolutely to the U.S. This, starting with those emerging countries that manage their economies with foreign resources, will result in the continuation of loss of values of local currencies of those countries that have experienced loss of blood in 2014.

The loss of blood of the euro against the dollar that started in the second half of 2014 is expected to continue in 2015 and the parity is expected to go down to 1.15.

When it comes to Turkey, what kind of a course the dollar that closed the last day of 2014 with 2.32 liras will follow is an important question. The course of the dollar will be determined by, again, capital movements that made it climb in 2014 when the capital inflow to Turkey was one half. The loss of appetite of the capital would bring new losses and especially with the start of interest rate increases in the U.S., one dollar may peak to 2.50 liras; it is expected. Nevertheless, where the annual average of the dollar in 2015 will land after standing at 2.20 liras in 2014 is a wait-and-see situation.

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Expectations not met, confidence decreasing in Turkey’s economy

Mustafa Sönmez – Hürriyet Daily News, /Jan.5/2015

Expectation surveys that measure the confidence of the real sector and consumers regarding the economic policies applied and their expectations related to the future are good way to feel the pulse of both the companies and the consumers, as well as help interpret expectations.

The December 2014 survey results have shown that confidence is decreasing in the economy policies and their results as implemented by the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP). Especially since mid-2013, when the U.S. announced that it would start a new monetary climate, it is being observed that expectations – even though they show some increases from time to time – are trending downward.

The Central Bank’s survey results on “expectations” revealed that expectations made in 2013 for the upcoming year had not come to pass by the end of 2014.

untitledExpectation surveys are conducted by the Central Bank each month to monitor the expectations related to various macroeconomic variables of decision-making and experts in the financial and real sector. The questions in the survey cover short and long-term expectations about basic macroeconomic variables, such as consumer inflation, exchange rate, current account balance, growth rate of gross domestic product and interest rates. The panel of participants is chosen among decision-makers, experts and professionals in the financial and real sectors, and also among experts in foreign financial institutions. Participation is on a voluntary basis.

Those who participated in the Central Bank’s expectation survey conducted in December 2013 estimated that the dollar exchange rate would be 2.1 Turkish Liras at the end of 2014. However, estimates failed and the expected dollar exchange rate did not happen. The dollar exchange rate, especially under the effect of the rising political risk when the AKP and the Gülen Community clashed and during the Dec. 17 and 25 corruption operations, rapidly climbed. Toward the end of January 2014, the dollar peaked at 2.40 liras. Despite being curbed by interest rate increases, nevertheless, the dollar was mostly high during 2014 and toward the end of the year, with the effect of FED decisions and the political climate, the dollar again saw 2.41 liras at mid-December before dropping to finish the year at around 2.32 liras.

Those participating in the Central Bank survey also estimated that the weekly repo interest rate, which is considered the benchmark interest rate, would be around 5.3 percent in December 2013; whereas the skyrocketing dollar exchange rate disrupted this estimate. To slow down the fire of the foreign exchange rate, the Central Bank did not refrain from increasing interest rates. The weekly repo interest rate was increased 5.5 points at the end of January 2014, from 4.5 percent to 10 percent. This was a shocking increase. Even though there were small drops in the following months, the repo interest rate closed 2014 at 8.25 percent, very much above expectations.

The inflation performance in 2014 was also above expectations. The participants in the Central Bank survey expected 6.7 percent inflation. However, especially with the resistance of food inflation, consumer inflation reached a peak of 9.2 percent annually in the month of November. As a result of the shrinkage in agriculture and its reflection on food prices, also high prices in restaurants and hotels that are affected by food prices, even though the consumer inflation was revised twice, the expectations did not come true and the consumer price index exceeded 9 percent.  Those who participated in the Central Bank’s 2015 survey have publicized their 2015 expectations. Those who responded to the Central Bank’s December 2014 survey expressed that their growth expectation for 2015 was 3.5 percent. In association with this, the current account deficit at the end of the year is predicted to be $44.7 billion.

Those participating in the survey also agree on a dollar exchange rate of 2.41 liras and an annual inflation rate of 7.2 percent.

Consumer confidence  

The results of the consumer trend survey, on the other hand, conducted in cooperation between the Turkish Statistical Institute (TÜİK) and the Central Bank reveals that there is a decline in consumer confidence. The Consumer Confidence Index has fallen 1.3 percent to become 67.7 in December 2014, when compared to November of the same year. Thus the confidence index has fallen 11 points from June 2013, when the world monetary climate started to change and also affect Turkey until the end of 2014.
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The probability of saving index decreased 7 percent in the month of December. The index which was 24.7 in November went back to 23 in December. This fall shows that the probability of consumers to save in the next 12 months is lower than the previous month.

Consumers are not positive about purchasing durable goods, automobiles, homes or the possibility to loan for them, and they have all answered the questions negatively, saying that circumstances were becoming tougher.

The Real Sector Confidence Index, which is the survey conducted by the Central Bank among top executives of those businesses that direct the country’s economy, operating in the manufacturing industry, is also trending downward. The confidence index of the real sector decreased 1.5 points in December 2014 compared to the previous month to become 101.2. This figure is the lowest in the last two years. The fall in the index reached 8 points as of June 2013.

In the Central Bank’s statement, it said, “While the assessments related to export orders for the next three months and the total orders of the last three months affect the index toward the increasing direction, the general situation, production, fixed investment expenditures, current total orders, current stock of finished products and total employment for the next three months have affected the index downwardly.”

ssWhile the real sector confidence index neared 112 in June 2013, in the following months it went down. The figure 101.4 seen in January 2014 was the lowest level since December 2012. The figure 101.2 in December 2014 drew attention because it was 0.2 points lower than January 2014 index value.

Expectations for 2015

It is expected that the downward trend and the fall of confidence in companies by consumers will also continue in 2015. It looks as if these, especially with the news of the expected increase in interest rates in the U.S. will prompt the withdrawal of foreign investors from Turkey, pulling down growth. The fact that 2015 is a general election year for Turkey means that the existing political risk will continue, at least until mid-year.

The geopolitical risks in the region, the fact that a solution has not been reached in the Kurdish issue and the deepening crisis in Russia  will be added to the economic and political risks of the country.

 

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Turkish Lira under dollar pressure

 

The year 2014 has been one in which the Turkish Lira plummeted under heavy pressure from the U.S. dollar. The lira last saw such pressure in 2009, the year when the global crisis took hold of Turkey. After overcoming that crisis, it again experienced the stress created by the climbing dollar in 2014. The lira is entering the new year with a lot of accumulated stress.

With only two work days left before 2015 arrives, if there are no shocking climbs in the lira value of the dollar, then the greenback will close December at an average of 2.28 liras and 2014 at an average of 2.19 liras. Thus, the lira will end the year 2014 with a value loss of 15.3 percent against the dollar. The dollar/lira parity closed 2013 with a loss of around 6 percent and an average of 1.90 liras. In 2014, it has experienced the sharpest devaluation since 2009.

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After 2009 

In 2009 when foreign investors withdrew immediately due to the harsh effect of the global crisis, the lira lost 19.7 percent of its value against the dollar, while the dollar exchange rate, which was 1.30 liras in 2008, leapt to 1.55 liras in 2009.

However, as of 2010, with a fast inflow of foreign investors, the dollar fell again and closed the year 2010 at 1.50 liras. The dollar rose again in the second half of 2011, closing that with an 11 percent loss. The annual average of the dollar was 1.67 liras in 2011.

In 2012, the devaluation of the lira against the dollar remained at around 7 percent, and its average was 1.80 liras.

FED wind

It started becoming obvious in May 2013 that the lira was going to devaluate rapidly in 2014. Following the decision by the FED to end their loose money policies, abandon their bond purchases and increase their interest rates, the loss in value of the lira sped up.

Simultaneously, local currencies of several emerging countries such as Russia, Brazil, Mexico, South Africa and India  rapidly lost value against the dollar; among them, the Russian ruble experienced an extraordinary devaluation, especially due to the economic sanctions of the United States and its allies and the fall in oil prices.

The loss of value in the lira from May 2013 to the end of 2014 reached 28 percent. During this period, while the dollar closed May 2013 with the monthly average of 1.82 dollars, its monthly average in December 2014 became 2.28 liras.

The fall of the lira against the dollar is two points below the 30 percent loss the Brazilian real has experienced. However, it is the Russian ruble that is experiencing the strongest earthquake, actually the disaster, among all the emerging country currencies. The ruble’s loss against the dollar as of May 2013 has exceeded 80 percent. The heaviest blow was experienced in the past two months. In order to slow the erosion of the ruble, Russian  monetary authorities are trying all means, including the extraordinary increase of interest rates, but the problem seems to lie in finding a political compromise with the U.S.

The South African rand also, among emerging country currencies, has devaluated more than 22 percent. It is also significant that the Mexican peso lost nearly 19 percent, while the Indian rupee went down nearly 15 percent.

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Not likely to descend in 2015      
Including the lira, the devaluation of local currencies of emerging countries against the dollar has not come to an end. With the interest rate increasing operations of the U.S. likely to start in the first quarter of 2015, the interest of foreign investors will be lost for countries such as Turkey.

This would mean both a lower growth for an economy that grows with external resources and also a much greater loss in value of the local currencies against the dollar.

In terms of Turkey, the dollar, which will be closing 2014 with an average close to 2.20 liras, is unlikely to start falling in 2015. The lira was troubled when the foreign capital inflow, which was $72 billion in 2013, dropped to approximately $37 billion in 2014. Officials attempted to restrict the dollar’s climb by applying interest rate increases. The dollar/lira parity, which saw 2.40 liras at the beginning of January, prompted the Central Bank to shockingly increase overnight repo interest rates by 5.5 points, up to 10 percent. The climbing of the dollar was stopped with this measure, while its fever went down with the decreasing of the political risk at March 30 local elections. But, again, as 2014 comes to an end, the lira’s annual devaluation is over 15 percent.

In 2015, any increase in the inflow of foreign capital to Turkey is not expected because of the increase in U.S. interest rates and because of economic, political and geopolitical fragilities. Domestic indicators are far from being heartwarming for the foreign investor. Increases in inflation, especially in food products, are showing resistance. Unemployment in September was 10.7 percent when seasonally adjusted; also, it looks as if it will climb further in the coming months. Many experts share the view that the economy, which grew far below expectation in the third quarter, will barely close 2014 with 2.8 percent growth. As a matter of fact, 4 percent was the growth target. This target was revised to 3.3 percent. At the end of the day, growth will be 2.8 percent and this means failure in growth targets.

The unpleasant outlook in economic indicators is also true for political risks. The tension is rising due to 2015 being the year of general elections, the climb in the tension between the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) and the Fethullah Gülen community and the fact that the AKP government is in a continuous state of intolerance toward opposition. The ongoing debates on corruption and a lack of laws have even strained relations with the European Union.

All of these are factors that have the potential to discourage foreign investors. When you add the geopolitical risk brought by Iraq and Syria, then there are adequate reasons for foreign interest to drop even further.

As a result, it is expected that the dollar exchange rate, which has had a monthly average of 2.28 lira in December, will continuously climb in the following months of 2015.

Heavy burden on dollar borrowers

The nearly 15 percent increase in the dollar exchange rate experienced in 2014 first troubled those institutions that had loans in dollars. Two-thirds of the foreign debts that were announced to be $402 billion in 2014 belong to the private sector and nearly 40 percent of it is due in less than 12 months. This means, for dollar debtors, that in each rise in the dollar, the debts are increasing with no other factor required.

The debtors in the public sector are subject to this burden at a rate of one-third; the real burden will be on debtor banks and private sector firms. It looks inevitable that the 2014 balance sheets of these corporations will contain significant losses from exchange rates. It has been suggested that this may cause serious falls in share prices and that certain banks and companies may demand rescue operations.

As well as making importation more expensive, deterring investments, thus slowing down growth and rising unemployment and causing cost inflation, the hike in the dollar exchange rate will cause other damage at an increasing rate in the coming months, according to expectations.

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Umbrella upturns: Growth slows, unemployment soars in economy

Mustafa Sönmez

Hürriyet Daily News /December -22 -2014

The U.S. will make the plane ascend with the interest rate increases it will introduce, after abandoning the loose monetary policies it adopted against the crisis and the accompanying monetary regime.
The EU is not at the same place, which does not allow the world to synchronize. How the re-growth of the U.S. will affect other regions is waited for impatiently.

The growth in the U.S. has also activated foreign investors, who had temporarily parked in countries such as Turkey before turning towards the U.S., while the world’s capital is set to take new positions. This means a sudden emptiness for those “emerging countries” that have grown their economies with foreign money.

With the withdrawal of foreign investors, local currencies lost value sharply against the dollar and are still losing. When interest rates were increased to curb the sharp falls, the economy froze between the high exchange rate and the high interest rate; growth rates neared zero or were limited to 1 to 2 percent.

Turkey has been under the influence of this since mid-2013. In Turkey, where political and geopolitical risks are added to its economic risks, the umbrella has overturned. The water does not run its course anymore; both the amount of water has decreased and the riverbed itself has become problematic. The year 2014 gave enough of an indication that it is time to move away from this set-up to another place. Let us see if a search for the new place will begin in 2015.

untitledSource:TÜİK

Turkey’s growth is likely to be around 2.5 percent in 2014, missing the target of 3.3 percent. This has developed in parallel with the decrease in capital inflow. In the first 10 months of 2014, the amount of inflowing capital was $31.6 billion – down 40 percent from the same period in 2013.

While a drop of nearly $2 billion is observed in direct investments, $3.5 billion of the $5.3 billion total of direct investments, in other words two-thirds, were related to real estate sales.

The current account deficit in total between January and October 2014 was $33 billion. The $31.6 billion of foreign capital inflow was not enough to fill the deficit, so unregistered – in other words net errors and capital omissions – inflows completed it.

Decline in growth

The changing of the financial climate, especially in the U.S., has brought about the slowing of the economy in emerging countries, including Turkey.

Turkey’s economy in the third quarter of 2014 was not able to meet its 3 percent target and grew only 1.7 percent. This was the lowest quarterly growth of the past two years.

It was quite astonishing that the economy, which grew 4.2 percent in the third quarter of 2013, grew only 1.7 percent in the third quarter of 2014. With this performance, the growth target, which was 4 percent initially but was revised to 3.3 percent, has become difficult to meet. In order to meet the 3.3 percent target, the economy which grew 2.8 percent in the first nine months has to reach 4.8 percent growth in the last quarter. This does not look possible. The fall in the third quarter was marked by the decline in agriculture and construction. The agriculture sector shrank 4.9 percent and the construction sector grew only 1 percent.

The drop in consumption, which appears as stagnation in the housing, automotive and white goods sectors, has negatively affected growth. The 4 percent figure, which is the growth target for 2015, is now being considered optimistic. Because of the increase of interest rates in the U.S. and the continuation of the interest rate-exchange rate spiral which is pulling growth down, the growth in 2015 is expected to actually be around 2 percent.

Unemployment climbing

While economic growth decreases, in other words while production and investments fall, unemployment climbs.

The number of unemployed became 3,064,000 in September 2014. The Turkish Statistical Office (TÜİK) declared the official unemployment rate was 10.5 percent. The unemployment rate has been declared to be 9.1 percent for men and 13.6 percent for women. Non-agricultural unemployment is estimated to be 12.7 percent in the same period. Youth unemployment between the ages of 15 and 24 is 19.1 percent.

bbSource:TÜİK

The unemployment rate in September 2013 was 9.4 percent, and the total number of unemployed was 2,560,000. This shows that the number of unemployed has increased by 537,000 people in 12 months.

Roughly, 6,000 people join the workforce market in Turkey every day and only 4,000 of them find the opportunity to be employed, while 2,000 join the army of the unemployed. This means an addition of 45,000 people to the army of the unemployed every month, 540,000 people every year.

Budget deficit rises also

When economic growth fell below 3 percent, then tax income also had a low course and its increase stayed at around 8 percent. This corresponds to 1 point below inflation. In other words, let alone an increase in taxes, they went back 1 point in real terms. On the other hand, budget expenditures increased 11 percent, which are 2 points above inflation. As a result, the budget, which had a deficit of 7 billion Turkish Liras in the first 10 months of last year, in the same period this year had a deficit of 15 billion liras, with an increase of 95 percent.

Interest expenditures within budget expenditures, which reached 45 billion liras, were close to each other in the first 10 months of this year and last year. Interest expenditures are 12.3 percent of the total.

Personnel expenses increased nearly 15 percent to become 94 billion liras, which were 6 points above inflation. The increase in the number of public employees has been the biggest factor in this rise.

A striking increase was experienced in budget expenditures in the premiums of the Social Security Institution (SGK) and its deficit financing items. The SGK took the biggest share of the central budget’s current transfers. From the 363 billion liras of expenditures of the budget in the first 10 months, 22 percent was allocated to its social security deficits and financing.”

Lira against dollar

With the detainment of personnel close to the Fethullah Gülen Community on Dec. 14, the political risk rose and together with other risks turned the markets upside down. Fluctuations in emerging markets, first and foremost in Russia, and the expectation of an increase of interest rates from the FED hit the markets big time.

Last week, the dollar rose to the historic level of 2.41 liras, but transactions continued at a lower rate later. The euro also rose with the dollar and exceeded the 3 lira level, then went below 3 lira.

If circumstances force a new raise of the interest rate, this would mean that 2015 will be a new stagnation and shrinking year for Turkey. It should not be too difficult to predict that such a bitter economic climate in a year when general elections will be held would upset certain voters.

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Agricultural Turkey rapidly becoming importer of farm goods

MUSTAFA SÖNMEZ – Hürriyet Daily News, December/15/2014
Inflation is continuing to be a major issue for Turkey; consumer inflation at the end of 2014 will be between the 9 and 10 percent band. The biggest headache in inflation is food inflation, with steep hikes in food prices being the biggest complaint of the low and middle income classes, which constitute the predominant segment of the population. The reason for this is that kitchen expenditures constitute 35-40 percent of the total budget of this segment.

Also with the onset of a drought this year, the prices of certain vegetables and fruits have become non-affordable. It is an accepted opinion that agriculture is being neglected and adequate support is not being provided for agriculture from the general budget. As a result, Turkey, which used to boast that it was self-sufficient, is rapidly becoming a food-agriculture importer. It is experiencing “food supply insecurity,” alongside energy insecurity.

Turkey has a significant and major agricultural potential. According to Turkish Statistical Institute (TÜİK) data, as of end of 2013, there was 38.4 million hectares of agricultural land, 14.6 million hectares of which grassland, with the remaining 23.8 million hectares being used for agricultural production. There is still an important agricultural potential in Turkey despite the rapid loss of farm land in favor of residential and industrial developments. However, the agriculture sector, where 20 percent of the active population works, has not been modernized. The agriculture sector’s growth rate in 2013 was 3.5 percent; its share in gross domestic product was 7.4 percent. In 2014, there will be no growth in agriculture; instead, there will be a shrinkage – albeit of 1 percent, meaning agriculture’s share in the national income could even stay at around 7 percent.

HDN

 

Prices

Although the agriculture potential is so high, food in Turkey is among a number of hard-to-obtain goods, as some food products have seen some of the highest price rises. The food sector stands out in consumer inflation; as of November, their annual price hikes reached 14 percent, while the “producer prices” of industrialists in the food sector have increased nearly 19 percent. This also means there will be new price hikes in the coming days for the consumer in food.

The prices of fruit and vegetables, especially the prices of legumes, has followed a very high course together with the effect of a dry season. Industrialists who process fruit and vegetables and produce such products as tomato paste, jam, canned goods and packaged legumes have increased their prices nearly 57 percent in the past 12 months.

Similarly, the monthly price hikes of those firms selling salami, sausages and packaged meat goods are close to 17 percent in the past 12 months.

Dairy producers who produce products such as milk, yogurt, butter and cheese, on the other hand, have raised their prices more than 14 percent in the past 12 months, exceeding the producer price index (ppi) by six points. While the flour industry and vegetable/animal fat producers increased the price of the fat they have been producing by around 9 percent, not going below the average ppi, it is also seen that the price hikes of bakery goods have also remained above the average.

Commissions

One of the most important reasons for the high price increases in agriculture is the extreme abuse of prices by middlemen between the producer and the consumer. The extensive differences between the prices in the field and the prices on the counter never decrease, and public authorities cannot introduce an effective control/regulation over them.

There are major differences between the producer prices of agricultural products in October 2014, as TÜİK has monitored, and particularly the prices the consumer pays, which TÜİK also monitors as part of its Consumer Price Index. According to this, in agricultural products, especially ones that have low supply, in other words low production because of the drought, the price difference between the field and the counter varies between 150 and 200 percent.

According to TÜİK findings, this difference has reached 200 percent in citrus fruits. For instance, one kilogram of lemons in the orchard is 1 Turkish Lira but when it reaches the counter, this price becomes 3.5 liras, making the difference in between almost 257 percent. Mandarin oranges, which are 70 kuruş in the orchard, are being sold to consumers at 2 liras, a difference that exceeds 200 percent. While locally grown bananas are sold for lower than 2 liras in the orchard, its counter price is 5 liras, a 180 percent difference.

One of the most consumed vegetables, the tomatoes had the producer price of 1.2 liras in October 2014, while it was sold at the counter for a price of 2.5 liras, a 110 percent difference.

When the food supply is inadequate, naturally, prices climb and food inflation pulls the general consumer inflation upward, and it looks as if fighting it is not so easy. One way to counter this is – even though its cost is not low – is importation. With the resort to vegetable and animal product imports, officials are increasing supply in an attempt to curb inflation. While it once boasted that it was self-sufficient, Turkey has now become a food importer in recent years with its food importation in the first nine months of 2014; during the January-September period, the figure neared $11 billion. While in the first nine months of 2013, $9.9 billion in food imports were conducted, this year’s exports exceeded $10.6 billion. Despite the dollar exchange rate climbing more than 20 percent in one year, the fact that food imports rose 6 percent instead of decreasing highlights the dependency in food.

The most important factor in the increasing dependency on food imports is the negligence of the food and animal husbandry sector.

For example, agriculture experts have drawn attention to the fact that animals in Turkey have fallen from 85 million to 41 million in 30 years. With the effect of policies downgrading animal husbandry, the extraordinary hike in meat prices which started in 2010 cannot be curbed.

The Justice and Development Party (AKP) government that decided to control the hike in meat prices with imports, subsequently decided on April 30, 2010, to allow the import of live animals and meat. The import of red meat, which was banned as of 1996, has restarted. After the permit to import, almost 4 million cattle, sheep and goats entered the country, with the bill in foreign currency exceeding $4 billion.

HDNLivestock processors such as Banvit and Koç stopped production on grounds that there was no opportunity left for locally produced meat to compete with imported meat, thus making the animal husbandry sector further dependent on imports.

Several studies and analyses show that one of the most strategic sectors of this century is agriculture and will continue to be so. Once more, the crucial importance of agriculture politics for countries has been proven. To meet the food needs of the world population, which is expected to exceed 9 billion by 2050, current agricultural production should be doubled. In the past decade, even though demand for food increased 20 percent, food production capacity only increased 8 percent. Obviously, food supply is not meeting the increase in food demand, resulting in the growth of the food supply problem.

Turkey’s population has increased 30 million in the past 30 years. It will be 85 million in 2023, 100 million in 2050. Turkey’s agricultural policies should be reviewed and shaped. For this, more protection for agriculture is needed, such as the support it deserves from the general budget, but the reality if just the opposite.

The share of agricultural support payments should be a minimum of 1 percent of the national income, according to a law from 2006. But in practice, this was not applied. Transfers from the budget to support agriculture were around 0.5 percent and 0.6 percent. In the 2015 program, the amount allocated for agricultural support was 10 billion liras. This is 5/1000th of the gross national product – a woefully inadequate amount.

If the law had been applied since 2007, the resources allocated for agriculture would have neared 100 billion liras in the 2007-2014 period. It did not happen. Agricultural support in these years remained at 55 billion liras. Thus, about 45 billion liras have not been channeled to agriculture, despite the law. The consequence of the support that was not allocated has come back to bite in the form of a decrease in production, erosion in agriculture and dependency on imports.

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Who wins and who loses as crude oil prices plunge?

Mustafa Sönmez – Hürriyet Daily News, December 8 2014

With the crude oil barrel price falling as low as $80, the benefits that energy-importer Turkey will enjoy are being exaggerated, as the country’s overall energy bill is climbing rapidly.
The average world price of crude oil per barrel, which was around $112, has fallen to around $70 within a couple of months, and questions such as “Why did this happen, who will win, who will lose?” have started to be asked more frequently. In the OPEC meeting held the other week, no decision came out about restricting production to curb the fall in prices. Immediately after the meeting, the price went down to $68, its lowest level in the past four and a half years. Talk is that oil barrel prices may even go below $60 in the first half of 2015.

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One scenario for why the price of oil has dropped is as follows: “Against the United States’ energy investments, this is the defense of the Arab world.” The U.S. oil industry’s initiatives in areas such as fracking, hydraulic-fracking and tar sand oil extraction are causing concern for oil exporters. At the top of the concerned countries are oil producers and exporters such as Saudi Arabia and Gulf countries, the economies and orders of which are based on the U.S.’ dependency on oil. Developments force them to not only take defensive measures, but also counterattack.

While the U.S. was importing 60 percent of its energy consumption in 2005, today this rate has gone down to 21 percent. Economic shrinkage is also effective in this drop, but the main reason is that the U.S. has increased its energy production. With new oil fields and new techniques, the U.S. has increased its daily production of petroleum liquids to 7.5 million barrels. In 2020, the production is expected to reach 14.2 million barrels. In this case, U.S. production will exceed the production of Saudi Arabia and Russia. These developments affect the equilibrium of the energy market.

Saudi Arabia and Gulf countries continue to lower prices to protect their markets. An answer to the question, “But to what extent?” is as follows:

The decision-making countries in OPEC are defending themselves by lowering the price of crude oil below $80 per barrel, which is considered to be the “break-even price” of American companies that operate in hydraulic-fracking. In other words, it is the limit for them to continue production profitably and exporters will continue to lower prices.

Associating the price fall with political motivations is the second scenario that attempts to explain the sharp fall in oil prices. According to this scenario, the U.S. and Saudi Arabia-Gulf countries are lowering oil prices to put pressure on Russia and Iran, which have taken the role of global and regional players. It is being argued that by lowering prices, a blow is made to their most important economic resource: oil.

Russia has lost nearly $100 billion this year because of oil prices; its economic growth, for this reason, is not expected to exceed 0.5 percent.

Meanwhile, this move by the U.S. and its allies is highly beneficial to energy-addicted countries such as Japan and China.

At 18 percent, the trade of fossil fuels accounts for a significant amount of world trade volume. According to World Trade Organization (WTO) data, these commodities have a more crucial importance in certain regions. For instance, in 2011, global exports reached more than $17 trillion, of which energy products accounted for more than $3 trillion, a share of 17.8 percent.

Energy is vitally significant in certain regions. For example, Middle East countries, which have a 7 percent share of world exports, accomplish two thirds of their sales through energy products. The Russia-led CIS has a 4 percent share of world trade, owing nearly 60 percent of it to energy. With $750 billion, Africa has a 3 percent share, 55 percent of which belongs to energy.

It is apparent that regionally, the Middle East, CIS and Africa, which obtain between 55 and 66 percent of their income from energy, will be hit by the fall in oil prices. Not every country in the Middle East will be hurt equally. Saudi Arabia and some of the Gulf States are resilient to this decrease, but the same does not go for Iran and Iraq. It is a reality that Russia has taken a heavy blow because of the fall in energy prices.

Dominant blocks and energy

It would be best to take a look at wealthy countries and country groups to see how they would be affected by the fall in energy prices. The European Union’s energy import bill for 2011 exceeded $992 billion. The EU has an exportation of $451 billion. In the end, the EU is a net importer of energy worth $541 billion.

The EU obtains 33 percent of its energy imports from within, 8.5 percent of which comes from Norway. The EU supplies nearly 28 percent of its energy demand from the CIS. Africa has a share of 12 percent and the Middle East around 10 percent.

The U.S.’ annual energy import bill is $464 billion. But it also has an annual exportation of nearly $130 billion. It is a net energy importer of $330 billion annually.

ffThe U.S. obtains 23 percent of its energy imports from Canada and about 10 percent from Mexico. It also imports 16.5 percent of its energy from both Africa and the Middle East. Russia has a nearly 6 percent share in the U.S. market. The U.S.’ annual energy bill of around $300 will indeed decrease with the drop in prices.

Two powers that will be positively affected by the price fall are Japan and China. Both of these two giants import energy worth $275 billion every year. They will probably benefit from price falls with low inflation, high growth and a strengthened current account balance.

Turkey…

On the other hand, with the crude oil barrel price falling as low as $80, the benefits energy-importer Turkey will enjoy from this are being presented in an exaggerated fashion. Turkey’s crude oil and natural gas consumption has rapidly increased over the past few years and in association with world price movements, the bill which was $8 billion in 2003, became $36 billion in 2013. The total energy bill combined with coal and other energy imports climbed to $54 billion in 2013, and its share in total imports to 21.5 percent. Of total imports, the share of crude oil and natural gas imports rose to 14 percent in 2013, after coming in at 11 percent in 2003.

In the period between 2003 and 2014, Turkey’s average crude oil bill has been $11 billion annually and its natural gas bill $13 billion, accounting for an average total of $24 billion annually. This corresponds to an average of 13 percent of Turkey’s imports yearly.

According to Turkish Statistical Institute (TÜİK) data, in 2013, when the crude oil barrel price was $110, Turkey’s crude oil and natural gas bill was $36 billion and it had a 14 percent share of the $252 billion total imports.

In the first nine months of 2014, the bill for crude oil and natural gas has reached $25 billion, with the average crude oil barrel price being $107 during the first nine months of the year. By the end of 2014, the bill is expected to be $32 billion. This would mean a decrease of only $4 billion in the oil-natural gas bill, even at the expected growth performance of 3 percent.

Despite this, when it comes to the consumer, there is no question of a decrease in gasoline-diesel, natural gas or electricity bills. Electricity and natural gas prices were increased by 9 percent at the beginning of October.

There is no decrease in gasoline and diesel prices to the extent experienced in the world because of the concern in Turkey that the indirect taxes collected over petroleum products would decrease.

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AKP İÇİN İSTANBUL TEPE TEPE SATILACAK BİR META

Redaksiyon Dergisi’nin Kasım 2014 sayısına  verilen Röportaj  (Söyleşi:Aslı Aydın)

Soru: Önce Soma sonra Torunlar… İş cinayetlerinde artık rakamlar korkutucu boyutlara ulaşıyor. Yetersiz düzeyde işçi sağlığı ve güvenliği tedbirleri olduğunu biliyoruz, ancak bu tedbirlerin hala sağlanmıyor oluşu, ölümler pahasına inşa edilen bir düzenin varlığından söz ettiriyor. Önce bu düzeni, yani AKP’nin “yeni” emek rejiminden bahsetmekle başlayalım mı?

Mustafa Sönmez- Bunun AKP’ye özgü bir emek rejimi olduğunu söyleyemeyiz. Bu, neoliberalizmin koyulaştırılmış emek sömürü rejimidir. En az ödeyerek en fazla artığı elde etmek… Bunun için işçiyi örgütsüz tutan, ant-sendikal bir yaklaşım, işçinin yasal bütün haklarını budamak, onun işverene maliyetini -vergi ve sigorta primi gibi maliyetler dahil, tüm maliyetler- en aza indirip kâr oranını olabildiği kadar yükseltmek… Bu rejim, 1980 sonrası Türkiye’de ve dünyada her yerde uygulanmak istendi ve isteniyor. Direnen ülkeler, yapılar var, direnemeyenler var. Türkiye’de direnişin beli 12 Eylül ile kırıldı. DİSK kapatıldı, Türk-İş 12 Eylül’e payanda yapıldı, Anayasa’da örgütlenmenin, toplu sözleşme, grev hakkı fiilen kullanılamaz hale getirildi. İşçi, işçinin kurdu yapıldı. İthalat daha çok libere edildiği için içerideki işverenler, “verimlilik, rekabet gücü” sağlamak adına işçinin ensesinde daha çok boza pişirmeye başladılar. İthalatın kontrollü olduğu ithal ikameci dönem pek öyle değildi. Hem özel sektörde hem devlette işçilerin örgütlenmeleri, hatta toplu pazarlık yapmaları bu kadar sıkıştırmıyordu işverenleri. Dış dünya ile entegrasyon, kıran kırana rekabet, patronları anti-sendikal duruşa adeta zorladı da ve siyaset, bunun iklimini yarattı 12 Eylül ile ve bu kurumlaştırıldı 1982 Anayasası ve onun çerçevesinde çıkarılan yasalar ile. AKP, bu rejimi miras aldı ve birçok şeyde olduğu gibi, müellifi Dünya Bankası-IMF’nin tam da isteğine uygun icra etti.

Son çıkan torba yasa ile AKP’nin taşeron çalışma biçiminde ısrarının devam ettiğini görüyoruz. İş cinayetleri ile özellikle toplumda büyük bir tepki oluşmuşken niye taşeron çalışmaya AKP bu denli ihtiyaç duyuyor?

-AKP, önceki hükümetlerin yarım bıraktığı neoliberal inşayı tam gaz, tek parti olmanın sağladığı avantaj ile, dış dünya konjonktürünün taşıdığı elverişli rüzgarlarla sürdürdü, sürdürmeye çabalıyor. Başlatılan ve AKP rejimine devrolan süreçlerden biri özelleştirmelerdi. Özelleştirilmek için tezgaha çıkarılan ve özelleştirilmeye hazırlanan kuruluşlarda en önemli şey, personel kalemini cazip tutmak. Bunun için daha devlet elinde iken esnek emek rejimine geçişin hazırlıkları yapıldı, özelleştirme sonrasında ise işverenler kesme-biçme işine girişip tensikatlara, sendikasızlaştırmalara, esnek rejim uygulamalarına geçtiler. Madenler bunun tipik bir örneğidir. Kamuda iken madenler işçilerin en örgütlü, dolayısıyla sosyal hakların en iyi durumda olduğu kurumlardı, iş cinayetleri de bu kadar yoğun olmuyordu. Özelleştirmeler sonrası ip koptu. Taşeronluk, neoliberalizm için emek maliyetlerini en aza indirmenin imkanını sunuyor ve ana kural değişmiyor; kâr ve sermaye birikimini azamileştirmek. İşçiler buna direnmedikçe, hem özelde hem devlette bunu hem işçilere hem beyaz yakalılara uygulamak ana kuraldır. Dünya rekabet kılıcı ensede çünkü ve biriktirmek zorundalar yoksa düşerler, adeta bisiklet üstünde pedal çevirmenin zorunluluğu gibi bir şey…
Taşeron çalışma şimdi kamuda bile var. Üstelik oldukça yaygın. İş cinayetlerinin dışında işçileri önümüzdeki dönem nasıl bir iklim bekliyor? Kimi görüşler yaratılan iklimini 19.yy’ın kölelik düzenine benzediğinden yana.

-Kamuda esnek rejim yine bir Dünya Bankası şablonu. Amaçlanan, kâr değilse de, sağlık, eğitim, adalet vb. kamusal hizmetleri en ucuza mal etmek, kamu hizmetlisini en ucuza çalıştırıp bütçeden personel gideri ve SGK primlerini, kamu bina ve alet-edavat giderlerini en azda tutmak, hatta hizmetin finansmanına hizmet alan yurttaşları da katmak… Bunu yaparsanız ,diyor Dünya Bankası, bütçeniz daha az açık verir ve bu sayede daha az kamu borçlanması, bu sayede de faizlerin düşük seyri ile bütçede faiz harcamaları da düşer ve sorunsuz bir bütçe ile sisteme müdahale imkanlarınız daha çok artar. AKP, mali disiplin adı altında 11 yıldır hep bu öğüdü yerine getiriyor. Bu rejimi, anlayışı, 19. yüzyılın kaba birikim rejimine benzetmek çok gerekli değil. Bunun başka türlüsünü kapitalizm yapamaz zaten. Buna ilkel birikim filan derseniz, o zaman hedef ilkel olmayan birikimi savunmak mı olacak? Kapitalizm bunu uygulamaya mecbur. Her yerde emekçi iliklerine kadar sömürülmek isteniyor ama bazı ülkelerde henüz izin vermiyor çalışan sınıflar, fark burada. Türkiye’de 12 Eylül ile birlikte zemin oluştu, toparlanamadı, örgütlenemedi, engel olamadı işçi sınıfı, diğer beyaz yakalı sınıf da aynı çarka kapıldı şimdi. Bundan vazgeçemezler. Taşeronlaşmayı, emeği en ucuza mal edecek her uygulamayı hem kamuda hem özelde deneyecek, bunun “yasal düzenini” inşa etmek isteyecekler. Kaçamazlar bundan, dünya rekabetinde de zayıflar, özürlüler, çok geriden geliyorlar ve rekabeti emek üstünden kazanmak istiyorlar.Ucuza memur,ucuza işçi, ucuza teknisyen,beyaz yakalı, öğretim görevlisi ana hedefleri.. …

Türkiye’de güvencesiz istihdama yani en düşük maliyetli istihdama ihtiyaç duyan sermaye birikimi bugün hangi alanlarda yoğunlaşıyor?
AKP rejimi 2003’ten bu yana dış para girişine dayalı içe dönük bir büyüme çizgisi izliyor. Düşük kur-yüksek faiz aralığından giren yabancı para, ağırlıkla konut-otomobil-eşya alımı için tüketici kredilerine, KOBİ kredilerine dönüşüyor, konut üretiminin başını çektiği bir çark döndürülüyor bu parayla, ithal ürünlerle dolu AVM’ler inşa ediliyor tüm yurtta. Burada inşaat çekişli bir büyüme, tüm sanayiyi, hizmetleri de şekillendiriyor. En çok iş cinayetlerinin yaşandığı inşaat zaten riskli bir işkolu ve arsa temini-imar izni kolaylıklarında öncelik alan, kayırılan AKP korumasındaki irili ufaklı işadamları bu kulvardan birikim sağlayarak rejimle bütünleşiyorlar. İnşaatın özellikle emek-yoğun aşamalarında hem düşük ücretli hem de iş güvencesizliğine ses çıkarmayacak örgütsüz emek istihdam ediliyor. Bunlar çoğunlukla ve geleneksel olarak Kürt emekçi gruplardan oluşuyor. Geleneksel çavuş ve onun hemşehrisi, akrabası, aşiretlisi Kürt emek grupları ve en çok da iş cinayetlerine bunlar kurban gidiyorlar. Keza, enerji, Türkiye kapitalizminin dışa bağımlı olduğu ithalatın dörtte birini oluşturan bir kalem ve burada da ithal ikamesine gitmek zorunlu hale geliyor,yerli kaynaklara dayalı enerji üretimi özendirilirken linyit yakan santraller ile linyit madenleri ilişkilendiriliyor ve linyiti en ucuza mal etmek için maden işçisini en ucuza sömürmek gerekiyor, hem de fazla iş güvenliği önlemine,aracına, yatırımına gitmeden. Enerji için HES’ler üstünden doğa da katlediliyor.

İnşaat,madencilik iş cinayetlerinin en yüksek olduğu ama aynı zamanda ücretlerin de düşük olduğu sektörler. Türkiye, ihracatta ancak ucuz emeğe dayalı sektörlerde “net ihracatçı”; yani ithalatı geçen ihracatı var. Bunlar da tekstil-konfeksiyon,gıda,deri, mobilya gibi sektörler. Bu sektörlerde de irili ufaklı birçok işyerinde, sendikasız, esnek çalıştırılan emek kitlesi var ve özellikle kadın emeğinin payı artıyor. Sağlık, perakende,eğitim, yine kadın emeğinin arttığı sektörler ve erkek ücretlerinin bir dilim altında hep ücretler…Kadınların toplamda yüzde 51’i kayıt dışı çalıştırılıyor, tarım dışında da toplam kadın çalışanların yüzde 30’unu buluyor kaçak çalıştırılan kadınlar…

Ekonomik getirisinin yanında havaalanı, köprü, kanal projeleri gibi bu yatırımlar üzerinde AKP’nin bu kadar durmasının sebebi ne?

İstanbul, AKP rejimi için tepe tepe satılacak bir “meta”. Dünya pazarlarına entegre olmada İstanbul’un taşı-toprağı, lojistiği, doğal ve tarihi varlıkları paraya tahvil edilmek siteniyor 1980 başlarından bu yana. Bunu en hunhar ve barbarca yapan AKP. İstanbul’un rantı en yüksek kısımlarını, bir kısmı rüşvet biçiminde kendisine dönen inşaat yatırımlarına açıktan sonra sıra İstanbul’un kuzeyine, ormanlık alanlarına, su havzalarına geldi. Burada 3.köprü,havaalanı, kanal vb ile devasa bir iç yatırım alanı açıyor yandaşı sermayedarlara. Bunlar kamu yatırımı gibi ama Kamu-Özel Ortaklığı isimli, neoliberalizmin yeni bir imtiyaz sistemiyle hayata geçiriliyor. Kamu, arsayı sağlıyor, finans temin etmede güvenceler veriyor ve bitişte hizmeti almayı taahhüt ediyor; karşılığında yapımcı yerli-yaabancı firmalara tesisi 49 yıllığına işletme hakkı tanıyor. Bu tür projeler, özellikle yandaş sermayedarın partner olduğu yatırımlar. Dolayısıyla AKP’ye rüşvet biçiminde geri dönüşleri olan, yandaşları iyice güçlendiren projeler. Tükenen inşaat pazarına soluk penceresi olacak projeler…

Yağmaya, talan ve daha katı bir sömürüye dur demek için nasıl bir mücadele örmek gerekir?

-Neoliberal rüzgar ile kırdan kente göç hızlandı, nüfusun dörtte üçü kentlere yığıldı. Bu, konut talebinin artması demek. Ayrıca, mevcut yapı stoku sağlıksız, depreme dayanıksız. Konut sahipliği ülke kültüründe yerleşik bir değer. Bütün bunları değerlendiren AKP rejimi kamu arsalarını ve imar izinleri yetkilerini bir koz olarak kullanıp inşaat odaklı bir büyüme süreci başlattı iktidar olunca…Kamu arsa stokunu tahsis yetkisi ve ruhsatlar sayesinde istediği burjuva kesimlerini palazlandırırken buradan üretilen rantların bir kısmını da rüşvet havuzunda toplayıp örgüt olarak ve kişisel güç olarak kendilerini güçlendirdiler. Bu zamanla öyle boyutlara ulaştı ki, İstanbul başta olmak üzere büyük kentleri yağmaya vardırdılar işi. Ancak bu yağmaya toplumsal direniş, Gezi sürecinde ifadesini buldu ve Gezi ruhuyla birçok yerde kent yağmasına karşı mücadeleler sürdürülüyor. Rejimin ise bu yoldan geri dönme şansı pek yok, yağmayı sürdürmekte ısrarlı olacaklar. İşte burada özellikle alt ve orta sınıftan kentlilerin kamusal alan olarak kenti, kamuya ait arsaları, parkları, kamu varlıklarını savunmaktan başlayan ama onu aşarak kamusal olanı sahiplenip kamu çıkarı odaklı bir üretime ve onun üstünde yükselen yeni bir hayat tarzı için mücadeleyi yükseltmesi gerekiyor. Burada da çok yönlü, çok bileşenli bir mücadele söz konusu. Bu mücadele, yağmayı sürdürürken işçi sömürüsünü koyultanlara karşı sendikal mücadele ile de iç içe geçecektir, çevreye duyarlılık gösteren orta sınıfların direnişleriyle de. Amaç, insafsız kapitalizmi terbiye edici bir hatta takılıp kalmak olmamalıdır. Bunu ancak sistemi reforme etmek isteyen sosyal demokratlar hedefleyebilir. Asıl amaç bu reformizmi aşıp kapitalizm karşıtı, kâr ve birikimi değil, toplumsal çıkarları önde tutan, herkesten yeteneğine göre katkı alınıp emeğine göre pay verilen sosyalist bir toplumsal düzeni inşa etmeyi uzun erimli olarak hedeflemek ve bunun mücadelesini vermek olmalıdır.

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