Net error and omission of $42 billion in 14 years – Is this unregistered capital inflow or black money?

Mustafa Sönmez – Hürriyet Daily News, November/23/2015

 In the first nine months of the year 2015, Turkey’s chronic illness or current account deficit was $25 billion. This deficit was $46 billion the entire year of 2014. For the whole year 2015, it looks as if it will be $42 billion.
It was not indeed certain structural transformations were that effective. Because the growth rate is low, the current account deficit also stays low. Investments that are the level of growth are at a very low level. When this is so, foreign currency spending on machinery and equipment is also low. With the foreign exchange rate rising by around 30 percent on average amid the Turkish Lira’s devaluation, import bills for Turkish companies paying in liras have increased. This has decreased imports. There are major drops in automobile, electronic and mobile phone imports. There are falls in bar gold imports, which were used as payment to Iran for natural gas imports. As a result, this decline in all foreign currency expenditures narrowed the current account deficit.

In a nutshell, the decline in current account deficit is because of the decline in growth.

How is the deficit closed?

Growth, which is expected to barely reach 3 percent this year, also causes the current account deficit to decrease. The noteworthy aspect of the current account deficit is the financing of this deficit. While the current account deficit of nine months was $25 billion at the end of August, the financing of the deficit was not met through foreign resources inflow, but through reserves and “net error and omission,” which made eyes turn to “unregistered capital inflow” again. It is not a small amount; only $8 billion of the $25 billion deficit was paid with foreign capital inflow, the source of which was known. Of the rest, $13 billion was paid through “net error and omission,” and $4 billion through reserves. The “net error and omission,” which had a 52 percent share in the financing of the deficit, was indeed drawing attention. But the real chaos happened when the official title of this resource was put into colloquial terms in media and politics.
‘Secret black money’

When this kind of capital inflow is called “unregistered inflow,” it is more likely to be understood as “money laundering and foreign currency coming from the crime economy.” For instance, daily Cumhuriyet’s headline on Nov. 14 was “Serious doubt in secret money.” The story said, “That rule has not changed: money inflow from unknown origins increases in every election campaign period. With two elections squeezed in one year, Turkey, in the first nine months of the year, had a 52 percent increase in money inflow of unknown origins compared to the same period last year, totaling $13.44 billion. This brings the same question to mind: Are election campaign expenditures financed by money without a known origin?”
Daily Cumhuriyet asked former finance minister and former head of BDDK Zekeriya Temizel where this money, which has been increasing since the Justice and Development Party (AKP) came to power in 2002, was coming from. The answer was, “This money may inflow because of the insecurities before elections; they may come because they love an environment when there is no monitoring and where prosecution does not take place; however, the fact that they increase during election campaign times brings to mind that they may be brought in for the financing of election expenditures.” Temizel said the origin of this money could be from criminal activities and that they can either enter the system in suitcases or through banks.

What is the truth?

An analysis covering the main items of the balance of payments between 2002 and the first nine months of 2015 shows that net error and omission or unregistered capital inflows are not that much of the total current account deficit and its financing. It also shows that it cannot be the sole indicator of black money in Turkey.

In the 14 years in question, Turkey had a total current account deficit of $471 billion. It seems as if this deficit was financed by $130 billion of foreign direct investment, $240 billion of foreign debts and $138 billion of hot money inflow, but this does not add up. The nearly $42 billion of foreign currency that was kept oversees was drawn inside Turkey. While the deficit was financed this way, the reserves were reinforced with $79 billion.

In this equation, the $42 billion “net error and omission” inflow, or unregistered inflow, is roughly the total of 14 years; its annual amount is barely $3 billion. The two years when this total most intensifies is 2011 and the first nine months of 2015. In 2011, it was $9 billion and in the first nine months of this year, it was $13.4 billion. The reason why 2015 stands out so much is that the same year, foreign capital inflow fell. In the first nine months of 2015, foreign capital inflow was as low as $8 billion, whereas even in the first nine months of 2014, this was close to $26 billion.


Calling the unnamed foreign currency inflow of about $3 billion annually “black money” may be good for propaganda but it doesn’t tell the truth. It also gives false information.

There is indeed some money laundering present in Turkey. It comes from the crime economy, primarily drug trafficking. But this is much, much higher than the $3 billion yearly and $42 billion in 14 years of “net error and omission” figures. Making these amounts out as this small and putting a figure on them would lead to the mistake of underestimating the real amount of black market money. The real black money may come through exports, imports, tourism inflow and foreign direct investment. If these items are classified as “registered” and “unregistered,” then they would leak into registered ones and not be noticed, thus becoming laundered…

Black money is disguised as direct investment, stock exchange investments and deposited money, and it is in amounts that may in reality be jaw-dropping. Just remember the gold deal of Riza Zarrab. The import of gold, its export, its transfer… Everything looked as if it was by the book but see what came under it…
Cheap politics routinely makes the same mistake by calling unnamed foreign currency inflow as “black money,” however, it only accounted for 8 percent of the country’s deficit in 14 years.

Other economies

Is “net error and omission” or unregistered foreign currency inflow unique to Turkey? No, it is not. Every country from the developed to the less developed has a “black foreign currency;” or net error and omission. For instance in 2013, Germany had an “omission” the size of 3.3 percent of its foreign currency inflow. Italy’s and Spain’s were higher than Turkey’s. Switzerland’s was over 5 percent and the U.S. had nearly 1 percent.
The Central Bank states that net error omission is due to export incomes that are held abroad and do not have to be brought into Turkey, along with late arrivals, statistical mistakes and late recordings in accounts. These can be seen in every country’s balance of payments. If the conjuncture in the country is beneficial for the firm to bring its foreign currency, then the firm brings its foreign currency; if not, then it is kept abroad. Thus, net error and omission is high at certain months, below zero in other months.

As a matter of fact, the high inflow of $13 billion in the first eight months of 2015 was related to the attractiveness of the Turkish Lira’s devaluation against the dollar and also due to the incentive granted by a government-introduced regulation in July. After this regulatory measure, money abroad was brought in and started being put in companies as cash capital. Because of this, the “error” increased $3.7 billion in August.

dış ekonomik, English kategorisine gönderildi | Net error and omission of $42 billion in 14 years – Is this unregistered capital inflow or black money? için yorumlar kapalı

AKP’s 1,300-lira minimum wage pledge challeng business world 

Mustafa Sönmez-Hürriyet Daily News, November/16/2015

The main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) prioritized improvement in income distribution in its election manifesto for the June 7 elections, also including pledges to advance social protection, triggering criticism from the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) and particularly from President Erdoğan  at every opportunity.

At every place he went, Erdoğan said he was appalled at the opposition parties’ pledges for the net minimum wage, with the CHP vowing 1,500 Turkish Liras (480 euros), the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) 1,800 liras and the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) 1,400 liras

“Believe me, I am appalled. The minimum wage is being auctioned. One says 1,800 the other 1,500. They are not aware of the minimum wage. What is the minimum wage right now? It is 1,000 liras. The employer cannot pay under 1,000 liras. What does the state guarantee? It says you will pay a minimum of 1,000 liras. This is an assurance…”

During the June 7 campaign, the AKP constantly asked CHP what the source of this would be. Following the drop in its votes to 40 percent, AKP preferred to take the road of the CHP. It included the minimum wage pledge in its Nov. 1 election manifesto and told minimum wage earners that it would be at least 1,300 liras

Against the AKP’s 1,300 lira pledge, the CHP promised 1,500 while the HDP said 2,000 liras as the MHP said 1,400 liras. Even though the AKP’s pledge was the lowest among the parties represented in the parliament, it again corresponds to a 30 percent increase in the current figure.

Babacan’s statement 

The AKP will now be challenged to keep this pledge. What kind of effects will a net 30 percent raise in the minimum wage create? The person who is expected to steer the economy in the new government and words by the person who has led the economy for years, Ali Babacan, were enough to stir things up. Babacan said the issue of the minimum wage should not be speculated upon. Speaking to the state-run TRT news channel, he said: “The minimum wage is determined by the Minimum Wage Commission. Both the employer and the employee segments are represented there. They sit down and talk. However, the government’s view is quite influential. What did we actually say? We said the net minimum wage will be offered at 1,300 liras to the commission for 2016. Our suggestion will be effective.”   On the dynamics of the commission works on the direction of the government’s demand, Babacan emphasized: “There should not be any speculation. Our 1,300 is net and this is the figure to be implemented in 2016.”   While Babacan was implying December 2016 for the net 1,300 liras minimum wage, meaning the wage for 2017, other top officials in the AKP sounded differently about the date.

While Deputy Prime Minister Numan Kurtulmuş said, “Nobody should doubt that the minimum wage will be 1,300 liras,” Economy Minister Nihat Zeybekci said, “If there are no legal problems, we guess it will be on Jan. 1, 2016.”

Apparently, there will be debates in the new government on the practice of the election pledge. Spokespeople for opposition parties and several unions started protesting the indecisive attitude of Babacan.

  • On behalf of employers

    The real reaction came from the employers and the head of the Ankara Chamber of Industry, Nurettin Özdebir, with a radical proclamation, suggested in an interview to daily Dünya, “The minimum wage should be abolished.”

    Özdebir criticized that the costs of the business world had been increased without consulting the business world. The rise in minimum wage will result after a while in downsizing and layoffs at SMEs, he said.

    “The rise in minimum wage is very important. When you make a 30 percent rise, then you are increasing the severance pay 30 percent also,” he said. “When you increase a 1,000-lira earner’s wage to 1,300, then you need to raise the 1,300-lira earners’ wage also, and this will push everyone’s wage upward…. This is a decision that has been made without asking the business world. If wage increases in the manufacturing industry and real sector are not supported by productivity, then it is an unjustified earning.”

    Özdebir also claimed that there were no minimum wage earners in the industry, saying the minimum wage earners in that sector were cleaners and office boys. Actually, a survey of Central Bank contradicts this.

    How many minimum wage earners?

    Wage statistics show that the minimum wage is nearing the average wage in Turkey. This fact was included in the Central Bank’s May 2015 Inflation Report on page 56. The microdata taken from the Turkish Statistical Institute’s (TÜİK) Household Workforce Survey is presented as such: “Almost 35 percent of the total of wage earners are paid minimum wage or under… Among wage earners, a clustering around the minimum wage is noticed. This is an indicator that minimum wage policies affect income distribution.”

    The lowest paid

    While the share of minimum and under-minimum wage earners in general in the economy is 35 percent; in the industry, construction and service sectors, this rate is 38.5 percent, 41.3 percent and 30.2 percent, respectively. This rate goes up to 72 percent in agriculture, and there are several industry and service sub branches where this rate climbs over 50 percent.

    The lowest paid ones work in personal care fields such as dry cleaning, hairdressers, food and beverages services, commerce and similar service sectors. In the industry sector, the highest rate of minimum wage earners are in sub branches such as food, clothing, furniture, the production of metal products and textile production.

    Below the minimum

    While the minimum wage is discussed, those who cannot even earn the minimum wage and millions without any income should be remembered. There are millions who lack a job that pays 1,000 liras. The population over 15 is roughly 57 million, and only 25.5 million of them have a paying job. The official number of the jobless is 3 million, but you can talk about at least another 3 million who are not counted. Thus, 6 million need a job, even if it pays the minimum.

    Besides these millions, not every wage earner can enjoy the “benefits” of the minimum wage. According to TÜİK, there are more than 2 million unregistered workers who cannot earn the official minimum wage. Thus, before discussing the figures in minimum wage, we should first remember the millions who cannot work even if it pays the minimum.

    Why low?

    While 35 percent of workers earn minimum wage or lower, that should not create the impression that the remaining 17 million are working with much higher wages. It was in July that the net minimum wage became 1,000 liras. With today’s exchange rates, this is about $300 to $330. Those who earn more are predominantly earning one-fourth more of the minimum wage, at around 1,200 to 1,500 liras.

    Why is this so? These 17 million workers are without any organization; they do not have unions. Only 10 percent of wage earners are members of unions. Even they cannot use their rights freely. There are only 2,000 people who can go on strike. In major workplaces, the cabinet block strikes by postponing them.

    The official 10 percent and unofficial 18 percent rates of unemployment are enough to “tame” the employed. With this fear in mind, they do not dare risk losing their jobs. In such a case, it is not difficult to hire people to work for the minimum wage or less, especially in certain sectors and in certainunderdeveloped countries.

Araştırma - Haber, English kategorisine gönderildi | AKP’s 1,300-lira minimum wage pledge challeng business world  için yorumlar kapalı

Mednuçe TV’ye 7 Kasım’da verilen mülakat

Genel kategorisine gönderildi | Mednuçe TV’ye 7 Kasım’da verilen mülakat için yorumlar kapalı

Will the renewed government be able to attract foreign capital?

Mustafa Sönmez – Hürriyet Daily News, Nov/9/2015

There is an important economic agenda for the Justice and Development Party (AKP), which came to power again with a quite surprising 49 percent of the vote in the Nov. 1 election. At the center of this agenda is the increase of foreign capital inflow. This requirement is very important both for growth targets and also to be able to rollover the debt burden we are face-to-face with.

From the first months of 2015, it can be seen that foreign capital inflow is visibly lower compared to previous years. As of September, Turkey’s current account deficit for the last 12 months was $43 billion but the capital inflow was $31 billion. The $12 billion difference was met by reserves and foreign currency inflow of uncertain origin. In previous years, there has not been such a need of reserves and other money sources to this extent. The decrease in foreign capital inflow is the highest in portfolio investments.

This decline of capital inflow is largely related to the increase in political, economic and geopolitical risks. Along with these local risks, the rate increase agenda of the U.S. Fed makes the foreign investor mobile, making them adopt a come-and-go stance. However, at the end of the day, the notable decline in foreign capital inflow in 2015 brought an unprecedented hike in the dollar exchange rate. The dollar was above 3 Turkish Liras before October and the annual change reached 36 percent nominally and 27 percent net of inflation. In October, with the effect of a relaxation by the Fed, the dollar/lira exchange rate also relaxed; however, this is temporary and depending on the Fed, a re-exit of foreign capital and following it, a climb in the dollar/lira rate is expected.

The renewed government is aiming to minimize the visible risks to re-enable the foreign capital inflow it absolutely needs. The renewed single-party government is considered the most important attraction. However, economic burdens, especially the foreign debt burden makes Turkey look highly fragile.

Foreign capital for growth

The 3 percent growth which was obtained in 2015 by scratching the bottom of the domestic market is not satisfactory for Turkey. The Medium Term Program (OVP) forecasts 4 percent growth for 2016. Compared to previous years, this is a modest target.

Because of intense capital inflows from 2002 to 2007, the drop in the dollar exchange rate was more than 12 percent annually. In this time, which was also the rise of the AKP, average annual capital inflow reached $25 billion and not only was the $19 billion annual current account deficit paid, reserves strengthened also. A similar climate was experienced in most of the “emerging” countries, from Brazil to India, South Africa and many Asian countries. The abundance of liquidity looking for a place to go, as well as the suitability of domestic dynamics, was influential in capital inflows and high growth.

In the second phase, which was between 2009 and 2015 when the global crisis hit, the dollar exchange rate lost an average of 5 percent annually. The years 2009 and 2015 pushed this average upward. In 2009, the loss against the dollar net of inflation was 19 percent; in 2015, it was 27 percent. In 2009, the dollar exchange rate was 1.55 liras; it went up to 2.85 liras in 2015. This nominal increase when freed from inflation is 5 percent annually. Nevertheless, even though this devaluation concentrated on two years and affected growth negatively, it was nevertheless spread in time. During the 2009-2015 period, the average annual general growth dropped to 3.5 percent, which corresponds to a decline of 3 points compared to the growth of the 2002-2008 period.

The decline in growth to 2 or 3 percent in recent years would not satisfy the population in Turkey, which is going through an official unemployment of 10 percent and, in reality, 17 percent. The required average growth rate per year is minimum 5 percent, but for this the continuity of foreign capital inflow is necessary. This tough issue, re-attracting foreign capital in this changing world climate and under the circumstances of Turkey’s increasing risks, is for the new government to solve.

Debt burden

It is vital for the new government to reactivate foreign capital inflow not only for the financing of growth but also for the rollover of Turkey’s outstanding external debt of $405 billion.

As of the end of June 2015, 71 percent of the outstanding external debt of $405 billion corresponding to $287.5 billion belonged to the private sector, the remaining 29 percent to the public sector.

The debt burden of the private sector increased particularly in those years when the exchange rate had a low course. In 2003, the first year of AKP rule, the private sector’s debt burden was $49 billion, having a share of 34 percent in Turkey’s total of $144 billion that year. Today, in other words 13 years later, the external debt burden of private firms and banks is $287.5 billion, equaling 71 percent of total debts.

More than two-thirds of this debt is short-dated. Those that have a 12-month maturity are 40 percent of the total. In other words, the renewed AKP government has a tough mission to create the means of rolling over a debt of $162 billion in 12 months with the least cost.

External world cautious

With the election results, the decrease in uncertainties and the fall in risks caused the valuation of the lira and the bourse to rise in the first business days after the election. However, the external world is cautious. It is exceptionally normal that markets react so to election results, however it is a reality that the external world has adopted quite a cautious approach regarding the problems Turkey is facing and the developments that might come later.

For instance, international rating agency Moody’s said the election result removed political uncertainty, however, the credit outlook will be determined by the policy environment and policy implementation that would overcome a slowdown in growth and high inflation, as well as the inhospitable capital environment that most (emerging markets) are going to be facing.

The rating agency said banks in Turkey still face elevated risk aversion toward emerging markets and elevated geopolitical risks.

Western analysts who regarded Turkey as a “model country, a miracle country” in the first years of the AKP rule are now saying that because of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s polarized stance, Turkey is now facing the risk of becoming an unmanageable Middle Eastern country. For instance, The Guardian writer Simon Tisdall wrote that Erdoğan was hailed by supporters as the “new [Mustafa Kemal] Atatürk,” mocked by enemies as a “wannabe Ottoman sultan.” Erdoğan now had the chance to shape modern Turkey to his liking and stamp his character, vision and conservative, neo-Islamist views on the country for generations to come, he also wrote.

On the other hand, there is also an anxious wait in the outer world on who will administrate the economy in the new cabinet. It is understood that if names such as Ali Babacan and Mehmet Şimşek are appointed, then these concerns will be removed but in the case that a team close to Erdoğan is selected, then these concerns will grow.

Araştırma - Haber, English kategorisine gönderildi | Will the renewed government be able to attract foreign capital? için yorumlar kapalı

1 Kasım’ı okumak ve mücadele…


 7 Haziran seçimlerinden tek başına iktidar olma şansını elde edemeyen Ak faşizmin, her tür koalisyon ihtimalinin önünü tıkayarak 1 Kasım’da yeniden seçim şansını kullandığını ve yeniden tek başına iktidar olma imkanı bulduğunu yaşadık, gördük.

Bunu nasıl başardığını da gördük ve hiç unutmayacağız. “Seni başkan yaptırmayacağız” şiarı ile 7 Haziran’da seçim barajına meydan okuyup yüzde 13 oy alan Kürt siyaseti ağırlıklı muhalefete savaş açarak 1 Kasım seçimlerine gittiler.

Ölüm ve sıtma

Suruç ve Ankara’da gerçekleştirilen IŞİD katliamlarıyla 134 insanın katlinden medet umdular. Ayrıca, Kürt illerini ablukaya alarak çoluk-çocuk demeden gerçekleştirilen sürek avı ile sonuç almak istediler ve 600’e varan can kaybı ile istedikleri oldu. Yarattıkları korku, panik havası, yaydıkları iç savaş tehditi, merkez medyayı basarak, korkutarak, HDP ile CHP ile dayanışanları sindirerek , kısaca kitleleri “ölümle korkutup sıtmaya razı ettiler”.

Seçimde her türlü hile-hurdayı, hukuk dışılığı, medya imkanlarını kullandılar. Terörle muhalefete miting yapma imkanı bile bırakmadılar.  Sonuçta, partisinin performansından memnun olmayan, savaş konseptini onaylayan MHP’li seçmenden, bir miktar da korkudan, tehditten yılan Kürt seçmenden oy alarak yüzde 49 ile tek başlarına iktidar olma şansını yeniden yakaladılar.

Kendilerinin bile ummadığı yüzde 49’luk oya ulaşmada korkutmanın, terörün seçmeni teslim almada işe yaradığını test eden Ak faşizmin, bunu bir yöntem olarak kullanmaya devam edeceği çok açık.

Kürt kartı yerine…

Ak faşizm, 2015’te bir şeyi daha netleştirmiştir; İstediği rejimin inşa sürecini tamamlamada, bu tarihe kadar ine kalka kullanageldiği Kürt kartını, MHP kartı ile değiştirmek gibi bir seçenek vardır ve bu, diğerinden daha az maliyetli, daha kullanışlıdır.

Hepimiz biliyoruz ki, AKP, iktidara geldiği 2002 Kasım’ından sonra kendisine alan açıp, potansiyel tehlike gördüğü muhaliflerini Ergenekon, Balyoz gibi kumpaslarla yok etme sürecinde, “demokratikleşme, sivilleşme” masallarıyla, sol liberalizm kadar, Kürt siyasetinden de destek gördü, en azından engelleme görmedi. Kürt siyasetini, İslamcılarla beraber Cumhuriyetin mağdur ettiği ve omuz omuza vermesi gereken müttefikler masalına, neredeyse inandırdı.

Uzun zaman CHP’de hakim ulusalcı çizginin Kürt sorununa herhangi bir çözüm öneremeyip, “devletçi” tavrında devam etmesi, Kürt siyasetini, “çözüm umuduyla” AKP’ye mecbur etti. Kürt siyaseti, birebir AKP’ye biat etmedi, ama başka muhatap olmadığı gerekçesiyle, sürekli bir “çözüm pazarlığı” içinde görüntü verdi.

Boş “açılımlar”…

İçi boş, soyut ve oyalamalarla dolu “Açılım, Oslo, İmralı, Dolmabahçe  müzakereleri” nden hiçbir somut sonuç çıkmadı. Çıkamazdı da. Çünkü Kürt siyasetinin asgari demokratikleşme programı, Ak faşizmin hızla merkezileşme, otoriterleşme, hatta totaliterleşme programına taban tabana zıttır. Kürt siyasetinin talep ettiği kimliğin tanınması, anadilin özgürce kullanılması, yerinden yönetime imkan tanıyacak şekilde merkezin bir kısım yetkilerini yerele devretmesi türü demokratik talepler, AKP’nin kimyasına hiçbir şekilde uygun değildir.  Ama AKP, uzun süre bunları anlıyormuş gibi yaparak ve istismar ederek  bir kısım Kürt seçmenin oyunu basamak yapmada ve tek başına iktidarda durmada hiçbir beis görmedi.

Kopuş ve MHP

Bu samimiyetsiz tavır, 7 Haziran seçimleri ile bozuldu ve seçim barajına meydan okuyan HDP, Batı’daki demokratların, sosyalistlerin de desteğiyle yüzde 13 oy alarak AKP’yi tek başına iktidar olamayacağı gerçeği ile yüz yüze bıraktı. Dolayısıyla 7 Haziran, AKP ile Kürt siyasetinin muhataplığında bir kopuş tarihi oldu aynı zamanda.

“Seni başkan yaptırmayacağız” şiarı, Kaçak Saray’daki RTE’nin masayı devirmesine yetti ve atılan köprüler ile birlikte savaş tamtamları da çalmaya başladı. Artık yeni bir müttefik gerekiyordu, boşluğu doldurmak için. O da MHP olacaktı.

MHP yönetimi, 7 Haziran sonrası izlediği kabız, negatif duruş ile tabanının tepkisini çekiyordu. Taban, iktidar nimetlerinden yararlanmak istiyor ama liderleri Bahçeli “Mr.No”yu oynuyordu. Bu memnuniyetsizliği sezen Kaçak Saray, MHP’li tabanı yanına çekmeye de yarayacak savaş konseptinin düğmesine basmada tereddüt etmedi. PKK ile alevlendirilecek çatışmalarla birlikte yükseltilen “Tek devlet, tek bayrak,tek millet” söylemi, şoven duruşlar, Tuğrul Türkeş’in AKP’ye transferi, yeni müttefik MHP’ye dönük hafriyatın işe yarar başlangıcıydı. 1 Kasım sonuçları, sonuç alındığını gösteriyordu ve burada hafriyatı sürdürmeye müsait bir topoğrafya vardı, ilerlenebilir, MHP, Ak faşizme entegre edilebilirdi. Artık bunun üstünde çalışılacaktı.

Başkanlık rüyası…

1 Kasım seçim “zaferi” sarhoşluğuyla Ak faşizm, rejime engel gördüklerine fütursuzca tehditler savurmada, biat istemede hiç gecikmedi. Özellikle merkez medyadan beklenen biat, hiç gecikmedi. Doğan Grubu, “Yeni bir sayfa” taahhüdü ile aman diledi. Bu tavrı, biat  istenen iş dünyası da göstermeye başladı. İzleyenler çıkacaktır. Aynı anda 1 Kasım seçim sürecinde pek dile getirilmeyen Kaçak Saray’ın rüyası Başkanlık tartışmaları da hemen tedavüle girdi. Korkutarak, terörle, iç savaşla tehdit ederek kitleleri teslim almak işe yarar bir yöntem olduğunun test edilmesi, RTE’nin başkanlık sıtmasını yeniden uyandırmıştı.

Başkanlık için en az 330 milletvekilinin oyu gerekiyor. Bu sayı referanduma götürüyor. Referanduma gitmeden sadece TBMM’de gerekli oy sayısı 367. Başkanlık veya anayasa değişikliği için 330 – 366 oy çıkarsa referanduma gidiliyor. AKP’nin şu an milletvekili sayısı 316.  Yani bu durumda referandum yolu görünüyor. Referandumda yüzde 50’den fazla başkanlık için evet oyu çıkarsa başkanlık sistemi hayata geçiyor. Ancak referandum sonrası, yeni yetkilerle başkanlık seçimi tekrar yapılır mı, bu henüz belli değil.

Hem AKP üst yönetiminde, milletvekilleri arasında, hem tabanda başkanlık sistemine yakın durmayanların bir hayli yüksek olduğu biliniyor. Anket sonuçları da bunu gösteriyor. Bununla birlikte RTE’nin bu kumarı da oynama ihtimali yüksek.

1 Kasım seçimi sonrası, RTE’nin bu ihtirasını bilen ve yeniden müzakere ihtiyacı içinde olan bazı HDP’lilerin, başkanlık modelini AKP ile diyalog köprüsü kurma ve masaya oturmada bir araç olarak kullanmak istedikler gözlendi. HDP sözcüsü Ayhan Bilgen’in “Başkanlığı tartışabiliriz” sözü Cumhuriyet’te manşet olunca, “Seni başkan yaptırmayacağız sözü ne çabuk unutuldu?” diye yoğun tepki verildi. Neyse ki, Eşbaşkan Demirtaş’ın, duruşumuzda bir değişiklik yok, güçlendirilmiş parlamento, güçlendirilmiş yerinden yönetim istiyoruz sözleri, yapılan gafı şimdilik düzeltmiş oldu.

Yeni dönem ve mücadele

Bundan sonrası aşağı yukarı belli: Ak faşizm, yeni koltuk değneği MHP ile daha milliyetçi ,şoven bir çizgiyi, tüm muhalefete karşı baskıcı, zorba hukuk tanımaz yönetimini koyultarak sürdürecek. Kürtlerin özgürlük mücadelesine kan ve ateş ile cevap verilecek. Ne var ki, bunun aynı zamanda AKP’yi yıpratacak bir tercih olacağı da aşikar.

AKP, yeniden iktidar döneminde üçlü baskı altında iktidarını sürdürmeye çalışacak: 1) Kürtlerin direnişi, 2)Ekonomik kırılganlık, 3) Hak ve özgürlükleri savunma mücadelesi…Kürtler, meclisteki 60 milletvekilinin parlamentodaki direnişinin yanı sıra bölgede sokakta sürdürdükleri sivil mücadele ve dağdaki silahlı mücadele ile AKP’nin korkulu rüyası olmayı sürdürecekler.

Önemli dış borç yükümlülükleri olan Türkiye kapitalizmi, dışa bağımlılığının ağır bedelini, bu yeni dönemde daha derinden yaşayacak ve yaşatacak. Yabancıların çekilişi ile birlikte doların hızlı tırmanışı, birçok çatlağın kırığa dönüşmesine yol açarken bunu çarşı-pazar derinden hissedecek ve ekonomik hoşnutsuzluklar hızla artacak.

Ak faşizmin sandık gücünden cüret bularak her tür demokratik hak ve özgürlükleri tırpanlama çabası, hem Meclisteki hem sokaktaki muhalefetten, bütün faşist baskılara ve yıldırmalara karşı direniş görecek. Özellikle krizin eşiğine gelinmesi ile birlikte işçi hareketinden umulmadık patlamaların yaşanması muhtemel.

AK faşizme yönelik bu  üçlü baskının demokratik muhalefet bileşenleri tarafından koordine edilmesi, güçbirliği ve dayanışmanın örgütlenmesi gerekiyor. HDP, yüzünü CHP’ye daha çok dönerken CHP’nin de Kürt siyasetinin beklentileri ile ilgili daha duyarlı bir tavır içinde olması, dayanışmayı artıracaktır.

Özellikle Kürt siyaseti anlamalıdır ki, Kürtlerin demokratik talepleri, tüm diğer kimliklerin demokratik talepleri, ezilen sınıfların özgürlük, demokrasi, adalet taleplerinden kopuk değildir ve kazanım, ancak bunun bir bütün olarak  algılanması ve bunlar için birlikte mücadele verilmesi ile kazanılabilir.


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Direnmeye Mecburuz…


1 Kasım seçimlerinin sonuçları herkes için sürpriz oldu sayılır. Başta anket firmaları olmak üzere, yorumcular, siyaset analistleri, bu ölçüde bir AKP oy artışı beklemiyorlardı.

Aslında Kaçak Saray tarafından sahneye konan iddia karmaşık değildi. 7 Haziran seçim sonucunu hazmedemeyen ve olası bir koalisyonun önünü mutad hukuk dışı davranışlarıyla tıkayan Kaçak Saray’daki, sahneye çok açık bir oyun koydu: Kaos senaryosu. Savaş çıkaracaktı PKK ile.

Bunun için, eldeki açık-örtülü bütün devletin silahlı güçlerinin yanı sıra, manipüle edilen IŞİD canileri de kullanıldı. Amaç şuydu: Saldırarak  PKK’yı da savaşa sürüklemek, başta Güneydoğu’dakiler olmak üzere kentleri savaş meydanına çevirip sivil halkı canından bezdirmek, bu savaşta PKK’yı doğrudan karşısına almayacak HDP’yi böylece başta Kürt seçmenden olmak üzere herkesten soğutmak, barajın altına düşürmek. İkinci beklentisi, savaşan güç olarak başta şoven-milliyetçi MHP seçmenini yanına çekmek, böylece MHP’nin altını oymak.

Senaryo, 30 küsur gencin ölümüyle sonuçlanan Suruç katliamına engel konulmayarak sahneye konuldu, ardından iki polisin, öncesinde bir astsubayın Adıyaman’da ölümüyle savaş çırası yakılmış oldu.

Kaos-savaş senaryosu buydu ama, dönüp sahibini de vursun diye bekledik. HDP, barışın dilini terk etmeyerek kitlesini konsolide etmeye çalıştı ve özellikle Güneydoğu dışında kalan Kürt seçmenin AKP’ye döneceğine ihtimal verilmedi.

PKK, savaşsa savaş, deyip onlarca cenazeyi Anadolu’ya gönderdikçe tabut başındaki feryatların dönüp AKP’yi vuracağı , MHP’den oy almak yerine MHP’ye oy getireceği sanıldı, o da olmadı.

Kaos-savaş senaryosundan bekleneni sonunda AKP, özellikle 10 Ekim katliamı sonrası ortaya çıkan korku tufanı, iç savaş tehditleri karşısında sinen, büzülen kitleden aldı. Can Dündar’ın iyi benzetmesi ile “Ölümle korkutup sıtmaya razı etti”. Yenilmiş AKP, koalisyon belirsizliği ve jeopolitiğimizdeki büyük risklerin getireceği ekonomik kaostan da korkan sağ seçmen, özellikle MHP seçmenin bir kısmı, güçlüye sığındı, AKP’ye oy attı.

İki oyuncu

Bugünden geriye bakıldığında, iki aktörün yanlış tutumlarının AKP’nin değirmenine su taşıdığını söyleyebiliriz. Birinci aktör MHP lideri Devlet Bahçeli’dir. Bahçeli, 7 Haziran seçimleri sonrası, tamamen HDP alerjisi üstüne izlediği “Mr.No” olarak, negatif siyaseti ile hem kendi kitlesini öfkelendirdi ve AKP’ye kaçırttı, hem de Kaçak Saray’dan hesap sorabilecek AKP dışı bir koalisyon ihtimalini dinamitledi. MHP’nin bu negatif siyaset çizgisi, kendi tabanının dağılmasında en etkili etken oldu.

Ak faşizmin , yanlış siyaset ile değirmenine su taşıyan ikinci aktör PKK-Kandil oldu. Savaş senaryosuna, pasif durmak, karşılık vermemek de bir yoldu. Bütün saldırılara karşı bu kez mazlum ve mağdur görünme şansı vardı. Zor ve yüksek tahammül isteyen bir seçenekti ama denenebilirdi. Bunu yapmak yerine, PKK, şiddete şiddetle karşılık vermeyi seçti. Bununla 7 Haziran’da yüzde 13’ü bulan kitlesini konsolide edeceğini sandı. Kandil’e bakılırsa HDP’ye verilmiş ödünç oy da yoktu ve HDP ödünç oylara teşekkür etmekle yanlış yapmıştı. Kandil’in HDP karşısındaki bu üstten ve sığ tavrı, 1 Kasım’da HDP’yi baraj altına bile itebilirdi. O zaman, ortaya telafisi daha da zor bir yenilgi çıkardı. Buna bile yatıp kalkıp şükretsinler.

Sonrası ve Kürt sorunu

Bundan sonrasında neler olacağı sır değil. Sandıktan istediğini elde eden Ak faşizm, bıraktığı yerden devam etmek isteyecektir. Meclis aritmetiği Başkanlık sistemine imkan vermiyor, AKP’nin bir kısmı da Başkanlık istemiyor.Ama fiili başkanlıktan geri durmuyor Kaçak Saray’daki. Ak faşizm, tabandan MHP ile kurduğu koalisyon üstünden  MHP’nin altını biraz daha oyarak gücünü daha da pekiştirmek isteyecektir. Buna milletvekili transferleri de dahil. Dolayısıyla MHP üstüne çalışma, AKP’nin güneminde kalmaya devam edecektir.

MHP’li unsurları da içine almış bir AK faşizmin, bu saatten sonra   Kürt sorunu konusunda “güvenlikçi-savaşçı” tutumdan  “müzakereci” tutuma geçmesine pek ihtimal yok. Artık, Kürt siyasetini kandırmaya ihtiyacım yok, diyerek masalardan uzak duracaktır. Kürtlere, ancak Barzanileşmeleri , PKK’dan uzaklaşmaları kaydıyla, bazı küçük lolipoplar dağıtılacağı söylenecek ve HDP’den uzaklaşmaları istenecektir.

Kürt siyasetinin savaş diliyle PKK üstünden, iktidarı masaya oturtma çabası olursa, bunun işe yaramayacağını bilmek gerekir. Kürt siyaseti, yine HDP üstünden, Türkiyelileşme şiarını terk etmeden ve ayrılıkçı-bölücü algılara yol açmadan, kardeşlik içinde tüm demokratik haklarını kitlesel barışçı yöntemlerle, tüm halklarla dayanışarak sağlama yolundan sapmamalıdır. Kandil’in bunu görmüş ve bu dersi çıkarmış olması gerekir.

Ne var ki, Ak faşizmin PKK ile karşı karşıya gelme sahası sadece TC toprakları değil artık. Suriye-Irak coğrafyasında, ABD ile Rusya ile hatta öteki IŞİD karşıtı güçlerle birlik olan PYD’ye dönük AKP iktidarı saldırıları, TSK ile PKK’yi yeniden çatıştırabilir.  Bu çatışmaların, içeriye, linç tutkunu faşistlere ne tür gerekçeler sunacağını, HDP hanesine ne maliyet yazacağını  PKK  iyi hesap etmelidir.

1 Kasım’dan MHP oylarıyla güçlenerek çıkan Ak faşizmin, şantiyesine dönüp yarıda kalmış öteki faşist inşadan uzak durmayacağı bilinmelidir. Yargıyı daha da kontrol altına alma, FG Cemaatinin iyice belini kırma, muhalif gördükleri merkez medyayı, onların arkasında duran merkez sermayeyi sindirme, biata zorlamada, “Nerede kalmıştık?” diyerek devam edecekler. Kent suçlarına, yağmalara, mega projelerine, “mikro reformlar” arı altında emeği köleleştirme planlarına  devam etmek isteyecekler.


1 Kasım’da  CHP, oylarını korumuş ve milletvekili sayısını 2 adet artırmış görünse de başarılı sayılmaz. Zaten kendileri de saymıyorlar. Ama sürece etki etme kapasitelerinin tek başlarına yeterli  olmadığını gördüler. Savaşa, ancak barış dilini koruyarak ve HDP’yi kollayarak sınırlı ölçüde tutum geliştirdiler. PKK’nın savaş dilini onaylamadılar ama isteseler de kaos senaryosunu engelleyemediler.

Bazı CHP seçmeni, HDP’nin abartılı özgüveni ile yüzde 17-18 oy tahminini duyunca, baraj sorunu kalmadığını düşünerek, bazıları da Güneydoğu’da HDP’nin de onaylamadığı “özyönetim müsamereleri”ni görünce ödünç oylarını geri çekti HDP’den ve CHP’ye yöneldi yeniden.


Rejimin yeni hükümetinin önünde kolay olmayan bir ekonomi gündemi var. Artan ekonomik ve politik risklerin yanında jeopolitik risklerden ürken yabancılar, ABD’de olan biten ve faizde yaşanabilecek artışları dikkate alarak Türkiye’ye karşı  iştahlı değildiler.

1 Kasım sonrasında, mevcut  riskleri azalmış görerek  iştahları açılır, dönüp gelirler mi, bundan dolayı dolar fiyatı çarpıcı düşüşler gösterir mi? Bu rüzgar ile büyüme çarkları dönerek Ak faşizmi mutlu eder mi?

Bütün bunlar, dış iklime de bağlı. Fed’in beklenen faiz artışı olursa, içeride riskler ne kadar azalmış görünürse görünsün, sermaye çıkışı yaşanabilir ve kemik erimesi yaşayan Türkiye kapitalizmi ciddi ölçüde sarsılabilir. Böyle bir dalga  AKP’ye oy vermiş seçmeni mutsuz edebilir. Ama bunun için çok sert dalgaların gelmesi ve sarsması gerekli. Gelebilir, gelmeyebilir de.

Boyun eğme…

Ekonomik kriz tanrısına bedduaya çıkma çaresizliğine düşmeden, derlenip toparlanmak, elde avuçta kalan ile, dayanışarak Ak faşizme 7 Haziran öncesi bıraktığımız yerden direnmek gerekiyor.

Ak faşizm, kimlikler üstünden Sünni İslam-milliyetçi bir kimlikle yüzde 50’ye yakın kitleyi safına geçirdi. Buna MHP’yi eklerseniz, yüzde 60 bir Sünni-milliyetçi kimlikli kitleden söz edebiliriz. Kimlikle kutuplaştırma, üçte ikisi ücretli-emekçi olan Türkiye toplumunda bir çarpıklık. Bu saflaşmayı,mutlaka “sınıf eksenine” çevirmek, emek mücadelesine ağırlık ve önem vererek yapılabilir. Ama bu, Ak faşizmin mağdur ettiği Kürt, Alevi ve öteki kimliklerin mücadelesini , programlarını dışlayarak, yadsıyarak değil, onları da CHP’nin, HDP’nin ve sol siyasetin birlikte duracağı, kol kola direneceği çok geniş yelpazede konsolide ederek yapılmalı.

Bunun potansiyelleri var ve bunları hem Mecliste hem sokakta, hayatın her alanında değerlendirmek, faşist mimarinin koyduğu her yeni tuğlaya direnmek, , inşayı yıkmak gerekiyor.

Yılgınlık, umutsuzluk, sadece Ak faşizmin işini kolaylaştırır ve toplumu tamamen teslim alarak iyice karanlıklara sürüklemesine seyirci kalmak olur.

Bunu yapamayız. Yapılmasına izin veremeyiz. Direnmeye mecburuz!…

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October morale boost in local currencies against the dollar

Mustafa Sönmez – Hürriyet daily News- November/2/2015

 Within the framework of the U.S. Federal Reserve’s (the Fed) normalization process, the uncertainty on when the first rate hike will happen is continuing, thus allowing several local currencies, including the Turkish Lira, to catch their breaths and take a break in their losses during the month of October.

While the Fed’s uncertain stance caused foreign funds to prefer emerging countries again, this trend made local currencies gain value against the dollar – even though in small amounts – and it has stopped their devaluation in October.

AdsızAccording to IMF data, among emerging countries the highest increase in value was seen in the Indonesian currency with nearly 8 percent. The Colombian peso also gained 5.2 percent in value against the dollar in October. The Russian ruble, which particularly had huge losses against the dollar in 2014, gained strength at a rate of 4.8 percent against the dollar in October. South Korean currency won and Malaysian currency gained more than 4 percent of value in October.

The lira’s average dollar price in October was 2.94 liras and compared to September’s average of 3.01 liras, its value gain was 2.3 percent.

The South African rand among other emerging countries also stopped losing blood in October and gained around 3 percent of value while the Mexican peso gained 2 percent. Others among the emerging ones, the Indian rupee and the Brazilian real gained about 1 percent.

The Chinese yuan on the other hand lost only 0.1 percent value against the dollar in October. The euro gained 0.6 percent against the dollar while among non-euro zone countries the Czech currency lost 0.4 and the Polish zloty lost 0.5 percent against the dollar. The U.K. pound sterling on the other hand lost 1.7 percent value against the dollar. The Japanese yen lost 0.6 percent.

Morale boost for the lira

The lira, which lost an average of 3.2 percent every month in 2015 and by the end of September reached an annual devaluation of 36 percent, was able to catch its breath slightly with the return of withdrawn foreign capital in October. The dollar/lira rate which was 3.05 lira at the beginning of October dropped to 2.9 lira at the end of the month, averaging 2.94 lira for the month, gaining 2.3 percent value compared to September.
In the October performance of the lira against the dollar, the comeback of foreign investors was effective. Before October, the foreign capital exit, which reached an average of $900 million monthly, left its place to a net inflow in October, although it is only $200 million. In October, foreigners stayed away from government securities; they invested more than $500 million on stocks, prices of which had dropped. While this return slowed down the climb in the dollar’s price, it has also curbed, for the moment, the rush toward the dollar.

Despite the halt in the lira’s devaluation in October and despite its gaining value, its loss of value for the past 12 months stayed at 30 percent. This value loss is again the most important devaluation rate compared to others.

There are some who explain the performance of the lira in October with the return of foreigners because of the uncertainty of the Fed; there are also others who interpret it as the preference of foreigners to return, having picked up the likelihood of a decrease in political risk.

There are those who claim that the lira has gained value because of expectations that the political uncertainty will come to an end, politicians will end the political deadlock of five months and form the government.

The credit risk of Turkey increased with the Justice and Development Party (AKP) losing its absolute majority after the June 7 elections, the first time since 2002 and following the inability of political groups to form a coalition government, thus with the finance markets of the country becoming more sensitive to the slowdown of emerging markets. However, there are some who argue that the expectation of a government to be formed after the elections has caused the appetite for Turkish assets to increase.

The US situation

Including Turkey, the Fed interest rate decision plays the key role in determining the situation of local currencies in emerging countries against the dollar and is regarded as the main variable determining the direction of foreign capital movements.

The course of indicators in the U.S., on the other hand, causes the Fed rate hike decision to be postponed again and again. Despite the improvement in employment markets, the pressure of increase in low wages, descending energy prices and because of the strengthening dollar, inflation continues to stay below the target rate. It is not only domestic economic circumstances but also global economic outlook that will definitely be effective in the timing of the rate hike decision of Fed.

Because of the uncertainty created by the normalization period of the Fed’s monetary policy and because of the slowdown of economic activities in developing countries, between the period of July and September, a significant portion of developing countries’ economies opted for changes in benchmark interest rates. The Chinese and Russian central banks once and Indian central bank twice decreased interest rates while the South African central bank twice increased rates and the Brazilian central bank once during the three month period.

China and other emerging countries  

One of the most important variables that influence the Fed’s rate decision is China’s situation.

The downward risks in the Chinese economy are becoming distinct. The weakening export performance of the Chinese economy, the sharp fall in producer prices and the observed slowing down in the manufacturing industry, as well as the fluctuations experienced in stock and forex markets in August, are seen as the biggest risks ahead of China  in reaching its growth target of 7 percent in 2015.

China devaluated its local currency 3 percent on Aug. 11 and Aug. 13 to provide foreign exchange stability and has taken steps to make market actors in the forex market more active. The target of the intervention is thought to be maintaining the high employment and growth path of the Chinese economy and fasten the process of becoming an international reserve and thus increasing the diplomatic reputation of the country.

Brazil, which is also the most important trade partner of China  in emerging countries, is continuing to be affected negatively from the slowdown in China. In the first quarter of the year, the Brazilian economy shrank 1.7 percent and 2.4 percent in the second quarter, thus entering a recession. Three major international credit rating agencies lowered Brazil’s rating in August and September one after the other.

Standard & Poor’s (S&P) lowered Brazil’s rating to “junk,” a level where no investment is recommended.

Meanwhile, India, which stood out with its growth at the beginning of 2015, lost speed in the second quarter of the year. Its growth which was 7.5 percent in the first quarter became 7 percent in the second quarter because of the weakening of the global demand and the Chinese economy.

As part of another emerging country, Russia’s economy is continuing to shrink. Low oil prices which have been ongoing for a long time as well as international sanctions continue to negatively affect the Russian economy. In the first quarter of 2015, the Russian economy shrank 2.2 percent and again in the second quarter it went down 4.6 percent.

An important variable that will affect the Fed’s rate decision and, therefore, the fate of local currencies, is oil prices. They hit their lowest in six years in January, but then started increasing until June when they entered a decreasing trend again. In addition to the U.S., West Africa and Kazakhstan’s increasing oil supply, the return of Iran to global markets have caused an increase in global supply. When considered together with the slowdown in global economic activity, this horizontal course in oil prices are expected to continue.

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Sıınflar mücadelesi ve medyadaki izdüşümü


Özellikle son zamanlarda artan Ak faşizmin  medya üstündeki  baskılarını  “Medya özgürlüğüne, ifade özgürlüğüne baskı ” gibi sığ kavramlarla çözümlemeye kalkmak pek açıklayıcı olmuyor ve bir dizi gerçeği de gözden saklıyor.

Özünde, medya, ideolojik düzeyin ana aktörü olarak (eğitim, din diğerleridir) toplumdaki sınıflar mücadelesinin diğer iki düzeyinin-ekonomik ve politik- tamamlayıcısıdır. Her sınıf hakimiyeti, ekonomik sömürüsünü politik hakimiyetle tek başına sağlayamaz, “rıza”da gerekir, sömürüyü meşrulaştırmak için…Bu da ideolojik aygıtlar gerektirir. İşte medya bu aygıtların başında gelir.  Bir toplumda medyanın saflaşması, dizilişi , toplumdaki  sınıfların mevzilenişine paralel seyreder, onun izdüşümünü oluşturur.


Bugünün Türkiye’sinde medyanın dizilişini sınıfların dizilişine göre tasnif edersek ortaya şu görüntü çıkar:

AKP, 2002’de iktidara gelişinden bu yana kendi  burjuva sınıf fraksiyonunun hakimiyetini inşa etmeye koyuldu. Sırtını dayayacağı hakim sınıf, kendi eliyle de hızla  palazlandıracağı İslami özellikli burjuva sınıf  olacaktı. Nitekim bunu özellikle inşaat odaklı ve devlet eliyle rant dağıtımının gerçekleştirildiği sektörler üstünden yaptı. Özelleştirmeler, kent rantları vs.nin dağıtımında özellikle yandaş burjuva kesimlerini kayırdı ve TÜSİAD’da örgütlü geleneksel egemen sınıfı da hep biata zorladı, biat etmeyenleri sindirme yolunu seçti.

On üç yıllık iktidarının önemli bir kısmında FG Cemaati ile el ele yürütülen bu yeni sınıf egemenliği inşasında, 2012’de yollar ayrıldı ve Cemaat karşı saflara geçerek hakim sınıf mücadelesinde  yeni  bir perdeye geçilirken Cemaat medyası da ittifaktan koparak muhalefete geçti.

Medya kümeleri

RTE liderliğindeki Ak faşizmin inşasında, başından beri medyada da yeni sınıf dizilişine paralel bir kümelenme yaşandı. AKP iktidara gelince bekleneceği gibi TRT ve AA kamu medyasını tamamen kontrolüne aldı. FG Cemaati, Zaman üstünden 1990’lı yıllardan başlayarak etkili bir medya donanımına sahipti. RTE tarafında Yeni Şafak ve Kanal 7 gibi TV  kanalları vardı. 2007’ye kadar olan iktidarında, geleneksel hakim burjuvazi ve onların kontrolündeki Doğan Grubu medyası ile iyi ilişkiler içinde olan, onların da bazen beklentilerini karşılayan Ak faşizm, bu tarihten sonra, hem tehdit olarak gördüğü geleneksel sivil-asker bürokrasiyi tasfiye etme, hem de ona arka çıkabilecek geleneksel(laik) sermaye kesimini etkisiz kılacak bir atağa geçti.

Başlatılan Ergenekon, Balyoz vb. operasyonlarını kitlelere meşru göstermek ve onlardan rıza almada,  medyaya önemli görevler düşecekti. Taraf gazetesi

sırf  bu amaçla  tetikçi olarak kullanılmak üzere Altan-Çongar ikilisine kurduruldu ve altına bir dizi saftirik sol liberal toplatıldı.Bu tarihten başlayarak hem RTE cenahı hem FG Cemaati yeni medyalarla donandılar, yeni biatlar sağladılar.

FG cenahında Tuncay Özkan’dan alınan Kanaltürk çekirdeğinde Akın İpek, Cemaatin hizmetinde Bugün Grubu’nu kurdu. Zaman, yeni gazete, dergi ve kanallarla takviye yaptı.

RTE, TMSF elindeki Sabah-ATV’yi damadının başında olduğu Çalık’a zimmetledi. Uzan’lardan alınan Star ile , Yeni Şafak’a atakla takviyeler yapıldı, Akit, en saldırgan gazete olarak görevlendirildi. Türkiye grubu zaten baştan biat etmişti. Şahenk, Ciner, Demirören  ellerindeki NTV, Habertürk ve Milliyet-Vatan ile RTE’ye biat ettiler …

Böylece Ak faşizm; 1) RTE’ye doğrudan bağlı, içinde kamu medyasının da olduğu  bir küme, 2)FG Cemaati üstünden bir küme ; 3) RTE’ye biat etmişlerden bir küme olarak 3 kümeden oluşan  olağanüstü bir medya desteği sağladı.

AK faşizmin karşısındakiler

Bu 3 kümenin karşısında ise “dördüncü küme” olarak,  sürekli biata zorlanan geleneksel büyük sermayeye daha yakın gruplar var; Bunlar TÜSİAD’ın da arkasında olduğu Doğan Grubu medyası, Sözcü, Fox TV, Kanal B, Halk TV, kısmen Cumhuriyet diye sıralanabilir. MHP ise  Yeniçağ, Orta Doğu, Bengütürk gibi medyalarla  alanda faal.

Bu 4 kümenin dışında kalanları ise “Beşinci küme” olarak adlandırmak mümkün. Bunlar, Kürt siyaseti  ve değişik sosyalist grupların düşük imkanlı gazete, dergi, kanal ve digital medyalarından oluşuyor (Birgün, Evrensel, Yurt,, Cem TV, Oda TV, Yön Radyo, İMC, Özgür Gündem, bianet,, Aydınlık-Ulusal Kanal  vb…)

Çatışmalar- çatlamalar

2012 başında, özellikle 17-25 Aralık operasyonları ile çatlayan AKP-Cemaat ittifakı ile birlikte medyalarında da yarılma yaşandı.  Akın İpek’in Bugün Grubu ile Zaman Grubu ve tetikçileri Taraf,  RTE rejimine cepheden muhalefete giriştiler.

Hegemonyadaki bu yarılma, Gezi direnişi ile ideolojik hegemonyası büyük yara alan RTE’yi yeni donanımlara itti. Sabah-ATV, Çalık’tan alınıp “Havuzcular” diye bilinen 5 li yandaş konsorsiyuma zimmetlenirken TMSF’deki Çukurova’nın elindeki medyalardan Akşam, yandaş Ethem Sancak’a aktarıldı, Show TV, biat eden Ciner’e verildi. Digitürk ise yakın zamanda kontroldeki bir Katar Grubu’na devredildi.

Bütün bunlar yapılırken RTE, Zaman’ın yazıişleri kadrosunu tutuklatacak saldırılardan geri durmadı ve son olarak “Terör örgütü” olarak nitelediği FG Cemaatinin medya uzantılarından Bugün Grubu’na  ekonomik kulp bularak mahkemeden el koydurdu ve  kayyuma teslimini sağladı.

Bu hukuk dışı saldırılar arsızca sürdürülürken aba altından değil açıkça, kendilerinden olmayan medyaya yenilerini gerçekleştireceklerini de açıkça ilan ettiler. Hürriyet’e yandaş bir savcı eliyle “ teröre destekçi “ davası  açılması, AKP MV Boynukalın öncülüğünde yapılan lümpen saldırı, Ahmet Hakan’ın dövdürülmesi, bu fütursuz saldırılardan bazı örnekler oluştururken sürekli olarak mahkemeler, muhalif yazarlara hakaret-iftira iddiaları  ile baskıya zorlandı.

Sınıf mücadelesinin izdüşümü 

Kürt siyaseti ve sosyalistleri temsil eden medya kümesi, sürekli baskılar ve dar ekonomik imkanlarla yaşam mücadelesi verirken hesapta olmayan bir başka muhalefet medya mecrası daha var; O da sosyal medya. Özellikle twitter  ve facebook üstünden sürdürülen “digital muhalefet”in RTE’nin korkulu rüyası olduğu ve bu mecraya sürekli saldırılar düzenlediği de biliniyor.

Siyasi olarak AKP rejimi ile ona muhalif olan burjuva ve halk sınıflarının ittifakı arasındaki mücadele 1 Kasım seçimleri ile bir hesaplaşmayı yaşadıktan sonra da devam edecek.

Ak faşizm cenahında yaşanabilecek bazı ayrışmaların izdüşümünü, medyalarında da izlemek söz konusu olabilecek. Daha şimdiden, “uzlaşma” kampanyası açan ve Davutoğlu’na daha yakın duran Yeni Şafak ile Kaçak Saray’ın sesi medyalar arasında  polemikler sessiz ve deniden gözlenmeye başlandı. Bunun 1 Kasım sonrası artmasını beklemek mümkün.

RTE’nin  biraz köşeye sıkışması halinde daha da saldırganlaşıp her tür muhalif medyaya daha açık saldırılara cüret edeceği söylenebilir. Bu saldırılar karşısında çıkış, sinmek değil, eldeki bütün imkanlarla, dayanışarak direnmek, bunu hayatın her alanında olduğu gibi, medya üstünden de gerçekleştirmektir.

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Drop in consumer confidence may reflect in the ballot box

Mustafa Sönmez – Hürriyet Daily News-October/ 26/2015

It is an undeniable fact that the economy has played a dominant role in the Justice and Development Party’s (AKP) 13-year rule. The voter has supported its economic performance.

The consumer confidence index (CCI) is an indicator that measures the confidence of consumers on markets and generally on the economic situation; it also shows the expectations of the consumer for the future, as well as its spending and saving tendencies. The CCI is determined according to the Consumer Trend Survey, done monthly by the Turkish Statistics Institute (TÜİK) and Central Bank. It is released by TÜİK every month.

Because of the scarcity of data, we can only start from 2007 to assess the relationship of the CCI and election results. When we review the CCI and election result relationship in those years, we see that when the CCI is high, more votes are cast for the AKP; when the confidence is down, votes are also down. While Turkey is going to the polls again on Nov. 1, there is deterioration in the confidence of the consumer. It is now wondered whether this dissatisfaction will reflect in the ballot box partially or completely.

Not temporary…

The AKP came to power with the general elections on Nov. 3, 2002, as the representative of political Islam. At the beginning, it was regarded by some as a political organization of the time that would rule for a temporary period, having benefitted from the erosion of the center right and center left.

People gave the AKP one term or, at the most, two terms; November 2015 will mark 13 full years of its rule. After 2002, in the general election of 2007 and 2011, it increased its vote rate from 34 percent to almost 49 percent. In local elections in 2004, 2009 and 2014, the AKP was, again, first. In 2007, the founder of the AKP, Abdullah Gül, was elected president by the parliament. In 2014, another founder and leader of the movement, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, was elected president by popular vote, a method used for the first time, with nearly 52 percent of the votes. The referendum for constitutional amendments was held on 2010 and the nearly 58 percent approval was considered as an AKP victory. In the June 7 elections of this year, the 40.9 percent the AKP received were not enough for a one-party rule and it was named as a historic date.

Now, eyes are on Nov. 1 when new elections will be held.

It is now a generally accepted statement that the AKP is not only a “government” but is actually in the process of building a “regime.”

Voter support

The AKP’s voter support of the past 13 years is the most important factor legitimizing the regime. The AKP came to power with 34 percent of the votes on Nov. 3, 2002, and increased its votes every year. There was a slight drop in the 2009 local elections; otherwise, it went from 30 percent to 40 percent to the brink of 50 percent and started falling in 2015.

How did this voter support grow and start to decrease?

Political Islam, parties of which did not reach the 20th percentile in the 1970s, 1980s or 1990s, seized power in 2002 with 34 percent, increasing its votes every year and thus building an Islamic regime. The biggest role in this was the economic growth and economic background.

What brought the AKP to power in 2002 was not its economic pledges. What made the voter chose the AKP was mostly the consequences of the bitter pill that the 59th coalition government of 1999-2002 had to resort to overcome the 2001 crisis.

The coalition government, led by Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit, partnered with the central right Motherland Party (ANAVATAN), Democratic Party (DP) and the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP). It experienced the 2001 crisis because of problems built up through the 1990s.

The central left, central right parties and the MHP brought Kemal Derviş to steer the economy through the 2001 crisis; a bitter IMF-controlled pill was introduced and as a result, the implementers of this bitter pill paid a heavy cost in the 2002 elections. At the same time, they left “boneless” public financing, the infrastructure for privatization and a functioning relationship with the  IMF  to the neoliberal AKP, set up by the Gül-Erdoğan duo breaking away from the Welfare Party (RP).

The world of the 2002-2007 period also helped this rectified economy. The AKP government coincided with major liquidity abundance in the world just before the global crisis, which meant plenty of external resources and high growth – even though it created the current account deficit. Those masses who had suffered in 2001 voted for the AKP over and over again when there was no reasonable alternative. The AKP, on the other hand, having found the unique climate to implement their regime scenarios, started building a regime full throttle.

The economic luck of the AKP

The AKP inherited the vital IMF/Kemal Derviş-produced reforms in banking, public sector, privatization in 2002. Inflation was rapidly dropping, and with price stability, a reformed Turkey climate coincided with the abundance of international liquidity, launching a rapid foreign investment inflow. The foreign capital inflow, which was not even $1 billion in the Özal era of 1980s, reached only $4 billion in the coalition governments’ era of 1990s but it averaged nearly $30 billion in the first five years of AKP rule.

The uninterrupted growth from 2003 to 2007 reflected in the CCI, thus in votes. In May 2007, the CCI was up to 82.3. In the elections of the same month, the AKP won 46.6 percent votes.

The economy felt a tremor in 2008 with the effect of the global crisis. The real effect of the crisis was felt in 2009; that year, the economy shrank 5 percent. Foreign investors withdrew. Economic shrinkage and increasing inflation shook the consumer. The CCI was measured 61.6 in March 2009. Local elections the same month reflected in the votes and the AKP received 38.3 percent of the votes, 8.3 points less than 2007.

The 2009 crisis was diverted through measures taken with the mobilization of the public budget without deepening and without further settling. The return of the foreign investor was achieved. With the annual average of $60 billion foreign money inflow in 2010 and 2011, a shocking growth rate of 9 percent was reached. Under these conditions, by mid-2011, the confidence of the consumer peaked with 83.2, bringing 49.8 percent of the votes for the AKP.

Start of the fall

The 2011 growth raised consumer satisfaction and AKP votes but with the low foreign exchange rate, the current account deficit exploded. In light of the high deficit, the AKP had to cool down the economy; it geared down and finished the year with 2 percent growth. In 2013, only 4 percent growth was achieved. The tempo of growth fell again in 2014 to 2.9 percent.

Political fragilities were added to economic fragilities. The rising terror of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant in Iraq and Syria and its image of closeness with the AKP added geopolitical risks to existing ones. This outlook pulled down the country’s credibility, prompting foreigners to leave rapidly.

In the 2014 local elections, the AKP received 43.4 percent votes, some 6.4 points less than 2011. In the same month, the CCI was 72.7, some 10 points less than its 2011 level.

2015 elections

Before the June elections, the CCI dropped to 66.4 and the AKP received 40.9 percent. This was drop of 6.5 points in CCI and 2.5 points in votes.

In September, the CCI was down to 58.5 and in October, it went up to 62.8. It is some 4 points below the index in June. Non-agricultural unemployment, inflation, drop in real salaries, concern in the payback of consumer loans, political instability, a climate of war, the  Ankara massacre with more than 100 deaths, high tension, negative news from the outside world and anxiety for the future all contribute to the drop.

If the relationship between CCI and votes continue as it previously has, then the AKP will only reach 41 percent of the votes, which will not give the AKP an opportunity at one-party rule. A coalition will become inevitable.

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Time for a low profile on economic targets

Mustafa Sönmez -Hürriyet Daily News, October/19/2015

A combination of political uncertainty and economic fragility in Turkey, as well as unstable circumstances externally, has forced Ankara’s economic targets for the 2016-2018 period to be reduced to a more modest level.
The 2016-2018 version of the Medium Term Program (OVP), which has to be prepared every year by law, was released by the Development Ministry and printed in the Official Gazette. The OVP is an elementary document that determines the basic macroeconomic indicators for the entire public sector and which associates policies with planning, programming and budgeting. Thus, the process of preparing the central administration budget begins with the cabinet accepting the OVP.

Those who drafted the plan have noted “There may be the need for certain updates in this OVP covering the 2016 through 2018 period before the new government to be formed after the Nov. 1 general elections sends the 2016 central administration budget to the parliament.” 


New targets

Without forgetting this reservation, when the 2016 OVP targets are reviewed, it can be said that there is quite a deviation from the targets set for 2015. Starting with growth, other targets in inflation and unemployment have not been reached, whereas in the current account deficit, there is a “recovery” coming from low growth, which is the only good news.

The new OVP states that the growth target which was set at 4 percent for 2015, will now be 3 percent. Given the fact that the growth in the past quarter was not particularly good, even 3 percent is an optimistic estimate.

The OVP used to define the national income with current prices over the dollar exchange rate and the 2015 target was set at $850 billion. But in the new OVP, instead of the dollar in current prices, the “dollar according to purchase power parity” has been used. This makes it difficult for the target to be met. However, the new OVP is hinting at the national income in dollars, in the ratio of the current account deficit to the national income. According to the OVP, the current account deficit will be $36.7 billion, while its rate to the national income will be 5.2 percent.

Then we understand that the unexposed national income is $706 billion… This means a drop of 12 percent of the $802 billion gross domestic product calculated for 2014. Again, this is what is not openly being said in the OVP: While the income per capita in dollars was $10,557 in 2014, it will drop down to $9,086 in 2015, calculated in terms of the population growth.

Inflation and unemployment are two other targets that were not met in 2015. The OVP hopes that consumer inflation will be 7.1 percent at the end of the year. Even if this becomes true, it will be above the 6.3 percent target. It was claimed that unemployment would not reach 10 percent in 2015 and would remain at 9.9 percent but the new OVP states that it will be 10.5 percent.

It looks as if low growth will bring a lower than targeted current account deficit. Instead of the $46 billion deficit expected, at the end of 2015, the deficit is estimated to be $36.7 billion. This will mean that the current account deficit ratio to GDP will go down to 5.2 percent.

Emerging countries 

“The global economy has been recovering since the 2008 crisis,” the new OVP states. “However, this recovery varies from country to country. With the Fed getting closer to making rate increases, a slowdown in China, a drop in commodity prices, increased financial fluctuations, falling global demand, weak capital inflows and a weakening of national currencies of emerging markets, all of these increase the downward risks, especially for emerging economies. Together with increasing geopolitical risks, these developments restrict global growth expectations for the next term… While the cost of international financing for developing countries has increased, commodity prices have remained low, which have negatively affected economic growth in several developing countries. Since the first months of 2015, several developing countries led by China, Russia and Brasil have opted for rate changes one after the other to provide financial stability.”

The current economic situation in emerging countries is expected to worsen according to the new OVP.

Reflections of Turkey 

The new OVP states that the GDP in the first half of 2015 increased 3.1 percent. It said they expected growth based on domestic demand to continue in the second half as well, while international demand will continue to negatively affect economic growth. Under these developments and expectations, the GDP is expected to increase about 3 percent in 2015.

What about 2015 growth? The OVP is setting a 4 percent growth target for next year while pulling down 1 point from the previous target of 5 percent. This target can only be met with domestic demand, it said.

The new OVP opts for low targets but it is unclear that the necessary external resource inflow will occur for this growth target. It is a huge question mark as to how this 4 percent growth will be achieved without the arrival of any foreign resources.

Unemployment and inflation 

Will the 4 percent growth projected for 2016 pull down unemployment? We see that the unemployment target set is still a two-digit one, no lower than 2015’s 10.5 percent.

What about inflation? The OVP said the annual consumer price index as of September 2015 was 7.9 percent. It is expected to be 7.6 percent at the end of the year. It will be 6.5 percent in 2016.

The new OVP sets optimistic targets for the lowering of the current account deficit. It projects an increase in exports, a decrease in imports and the foreign trade deficit to go down to $66 billion in 2016 and the current deficit in tourism and other incomes to go down to $36 billion. Thus, the ratio of the current account deficit to national income is expected to drop to 4.9 percent.

Open to revisions 

Medium-term programs are prepared every year by law, targets are revised and new targets are set. The medium-term program prepared for 2016-2018 said the new government to be formed after the Nov. 1 elections may revise the targets. Thus, the document printed in the Official Gazette is open to a renewal of targets.

The medium-term program is a meaningful document, especially in terms of foreign investors because they want to see where the country is heading and with which policies it will achieve its targets.

Of course, both domestic economic and political developments and events in the international world may increase or decrease the chances of the targets to be achieved – or not – in the plan.

Everything is yet to occur and be seen. It is not easy to achieve the targets but one has to have some targets.

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